Europe’s Role for Security in a Multipolar World

Views from India and China

New Delhi, 26th -27th September, 2013
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"An excellent opportunity to outreach to the Indian intelligentsia regarding the role of the EU as a security actor. In India, the EU is not perceived as yet as an important player in that realm and hence it was a very timely event.” Anne Marchal, Delegation of the European Union to India
Europe’s Role for Security in a Multipolar World:

Views from India and China

The NFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of the European Union” hosted its second Annual Conference and Academic Council meeting at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, on 26-27 September 2013. The conference was jointly organized by the NFG, the Jawaharlal Nehru University, the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-India.

It was made possible by the generous funding of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the German Ministry of Education and Research.¹

Headed by Dr. May-Britt U. Stumbaum and advised by an international Academic Council, the Berlin-based NFG Research Group seeks to examine how the EU is perceived and assessed as a security actor in China and India by bringing together European, Chinese, and Indian academics and policy-makers working in this area in a Networked Think Tank (www.asianperception.eu). The conference was attended by 40 selected participants, including some of the most prominent academics working in this field in China, India, Japan and Europe, representatives of European embassies, and leading position holders in the military as well as the policy making establishment in New Delhi.

The conference was held under Chatham House rules. This report provides a summary of the key themes which emerged from the conference.²

¹ We would like to thank the organizational team of the NFG, Florian Britsch, Garima Mohan, Olivia Gippner, Jizhou Zhao, and Katharina Arseven, along with David Neubauer and Johanna Günther. We also express our gratitude to our local partners, the ORF and their organizational support staff, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundtion, the German Embassy and the EU Delegation to India, the FU Berlin International Office in Delhi as well as the dedicated team of student assistants from JNU. A particular thanks goes to the Members of the Academic Council for their enduring support, Ummu Salma Bava (JNU), Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel (FUB), Lian Yu-Ru (PKU) and Karl Kaiser (Harvard). And finally, to all conference speakers and participants, we offer our sincere thanks, for their valuable contributions.

² The conference was made possible due to the generosity of our funders- Fritz Thyssen Foundation; the Friedrich Ebert Foundation; and the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). We would like to express our gratitude to them.
Discussion Highlights - Executive Summary

Ambivalence towards the EU’s role as a security actor in a multipolar world: The EU is still inconsistent and lacks capabilities as a security actor, but its military power and willingness to intervene should not be underestimated. The EU’s insistence on multilateralism is a strength and does not necessarily limit Europe’s ability to shape global governance.

Perceptions shape assessments: Perceptions play an important role in shaping assessments of the EU as a security actor. Differences in mutual perceptions stem not only from information deficits, but also from different historical trajectories and contexts. Different perceptions lie at the heart of a process of ‘othering’, leading to mutual misperceptions. These should be minimised as much as possible.

Context matters – the EU as a security actor in Asia: The EU needs to overcome a one-dimensional view of Asia as solely a region of vast economic opportunities, and must recognise the complex and varied security challenges in the region. The EU should focus on its existing strengths, for example in non-traditional security areas, and reorient its strategy as a security actor only where appropriate, striking a balance between strategic assertiveness and restraint.

The EU’s need to reorient its strategy as security actor in Asia vis-a-vis the US: Many participants contrasted the roles of the EU and the US as security actors in a multipolar world in general, and in Asia in particular. Although the EU is recognised as a crucial economic actor in the region, the US has a higher profile as a security actor. Because of this, the EU needs to position itself more clearly vis-à-vis the US’s rebalancing strategy in the region, and should develop a clearly defined security model for Asia.

Strategic partnerships underperform: Discussion also focused on the role of strategic partnerships in shaping the EU’s security relations with India and China. There is no common understanding of what roles strategic partnerships can play: Do they have a distinct functionality for bilateral relations, or do they merely describe the means and rules of bilateral engagement? Discussion focused in particular on the EU-India strategic partnership, which has not yet lived up to its full potential. While the EU-China strategic partnership is less static than the EU-Indian one, it still lacks dynamism.

Most recent findings of NFG Research Group case studies discussed - peacekeeping and export controls: The NFG Research Group presented its most recent findings in two case studies on EU-Indian/EU-Chinese cooperation in peacekeeping and export control regimes. Distinguished experts from India, China, Japan, the EU and the US used break-out sessions to discuss and assess the results from extensive field research and the future research agenda.
1. On the Conference

The NFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of the European Union” hosted its Third Annual Conference and Academic Council Meeting in New Delhi, on 26-27 September 2013. This third Annual Conference built upon the discussions and results of previous conferences in Berlin (2011) and Beijing (2012), and brought together a community of distinguished policy-makers and scholars from India, China, Japan, the United States and Europe to discuss and compare their perspectives on Asian perceptions of the EU as a security actor.

The conference also provided a platform to present the most recent findings from extensive field research in the NFG’s two core case studies: EU-Asian cooperation in (i) peacekeeping and (ii) export control regimes. Discussion also centred on the role of strategic partnerships, differences between the EU and the US model of security, as well as past, present and future roles for the EU as a security actor in Asia.

Keynote addresses were delivered by the Indian Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, Hon. Manish Tewari, and the EU Ambassador to India, H.E. João Cravinho. The discussions were held under the Chatham House rule. This report identifies the key themes that emerged from the conference.

“The Delhi conference put into sharp relief the mutual perceptions between India and the EU highlighting not only the Indian focus (excessive by European standards) on military power in assessing the EU, but also the European failure to devote attention to Indian affairs commensurate to India’s importance.”

Karl Kaiser, Harvard

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3 As an online resource, detailed information on the research agenda of the NFG, publications in the form of Working Papers, as well as a comprehensive bibliography providing access to the latest research in the case countries is available on the group’s website, www.asianperceptions.eu.
2. Key Theme: The EU as a Security Actor in a Multipolar World

The central theme of the conference was how the EU is perceived as a security actor in Asia, especially among scholars and policy-makers in India and China. Indian, Chinese and European experts shared their insights on: the role of perception when judging the EU as a security actor; how the EU’s complexity impacts on foreign relations; the ‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’ image of the EU and its limited role in traditional security matters in Asia; the EU’s security role vis-à-vis NATO and other regional/bilateral security arrangements; the merits and drawbacks of multilateralism and bilateralism; the EU’s view on interventionism and responsibility to protect (R2P); the current state of the EU-India and EU-China strategic partnerships and future prospects; the EU’s need and ongoing attempt to rebalance its relations with India and China; the positioning on export controls and peacekeeping and the future research agenda on these issues; and the different ways the EU and the US imagine their role as security actors, in general, and in Asia in particular.

2.1 Perceptions of the EU as a Limited Security Actor

Indian participants highlighted the importance of the EU as a historical experiment in integration and peace-building as well as the contribution of European intellectual discourse to the political trajectory of many countries in South Asia. India and Europe have a long history of relations, share common cultural values such as democracy, and the EU is India’s largest trading partner. At the same time, however, the Indian view of the EU as a security actor in today’s multipolar world is less enthusiastic. From the Indian perspective, European security capabilities still reside with individual EU member states, and the EU’s emphasis on multilateralism and supranational institutions collides with the Indian focus on sovereignty and bilateralism. The EU’s engagement with India, as well as the Asian continent more broadly, is largely played out in the realm of soft power. From a security perspective, this is generally seen as non-consequential and directionless.

An EU delegate acknowledged the Indian perception that the EU has an ‘agency deficit’, especially in security matters, and agreed that for a long time, the EU has been regarded as a trade bloc. However, the EU’s lack of agency and willingness is only part of the story and Indian preferences matter as well: does India truly wish to engage with the EU more thoroughly? India is changing its policy of non-alignment and starting to shoulder its responsibility as an emerging power, but the EU so far does not figure prominently in India’s foreign policy considerations. India should reconsider its view in that regard.

The EU is not seen as a fully-fledged security actor, but as a public goods provider and therefore more interested in a partnership mode when dealing with emerging powers.
Chinese participants largely shared the view of their Indian colleagues, viewing the EU as an economic giant, and a political dwarf. The EU doesn’t have a clear position on how to engage China politically and must learn how to translate its huge economic assets into geo-economic tools. In contrast to the predominant view among the Indian participants, however, one Chinese participant viewed the EU’s image as a civilian or soft power as an asset. Considering the nexus between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues, the EU’s perceived strategic weakness in traditional security matters gives it more leverage when dealing with non-traditional security challenges. This last point resonated with the view of some Indian participants who see the EU not as a fully-fledged security actor, but as a public goods provider.

2.2 Divisions among the EU and Member States

There was a general consensus among Indian and Chinese participants that the lack of clarity regarding the EU’s positioning and capability as a security actor largely results from the lack of a common understanding between the EU and its member states. The EU is not perceived as an effective actor in its own right. With their preference for bilateralism in security matters, both India and China would rather continue to deal with the individual member states. One Indian participant put it as follows: “If India can deal with the EU member states with which it has traditionally enjoyed good relations, what is the added value of the EU?”

Differences in foreign and security policy between the EU and its member states are most visible when it comes to questions of intervention, defence integration and cooperation. The diverging interests of EU member states were highlighted with regard to interventions (e.g. with reference to the case of Syria). Both Asian and European participants agreed that bilateral cooperation takes priority in defence cooperation, due to the fact that member states are competitors and are much more active diplomatically in India compared with the EU. There is also a lack of clarity regarding the EU’s security role vis-à-vis NATO, the US and other regional security arrangements. India and China largely view the EU as a security actor through the prism of NATO.

“The conference allowed us to debate, discuss and tease out common objectives and some disagreements between the regions. Indian perceptions are overwhelmingly shaped by a euro-skeptic English media. Ultimately the cleavage is not one of a security and Realpolitik obsessed India and a (perceived) de-securitised Europe, but rather of a values based discourse and needs based discourse.”

Samir Saran, ORF
2.3 European Strengths are Underestimated

European participants conceded that the EU still displays inconsistency and a lack of capabilities as a security actor, due to the fact that it is an evolving project and the sum of its parts. They also highlighted that this view is largely reflected in the European discourse on the EU as well. However, some caveats were mentioned with regard to this perception. On the one hand, the EU’s military power and willingness to intervene should not be underestimated. The missions in the Balkans, in Somalia and Operation Atalanta have shown that the EU is able and willing to deploy military assets against security challenges on its own. These interventions are also of major importance to global security. On the other hand, the EU’s insistence on multilateralism is also a strength and does not limit the EU’s effectiveness in shaping global governance. Multilateralism helps to integrate smaller and larger powers and offers a solution to the security dilemma.

The discussions highlighted the role of perception in the assessment of the EU as a security actor. While one Indian participant acknowledged that, to a certain extent, the EU and India share similar perceptions of security at the international level (e.g. a stable Middle East, a stable Afghanistan), their approach to addressing these needs has different normative underpinnings: ‘You call it values, we call it interests’. This reflected discussion at the NFG Research Group’s Beijing conference on the distinction between a ‘normative Europe’ and a ‘realist India’.

2.4 Underlying Causes of Mutual Misperception

Participants also discussed the causes of differing perceptions of oneself and of each other, noting the importance not just of information deficits, but also different historical trajectories and contexts. Asian minds, as one participant noted, are still set on massive domestic development needs and historical injustice that reflect on a perceived asymmetry at the international or global level.

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Echoing the NFG’s 2012 Annual Conference in Beijing, participants at this year’s conference agreed that there is no such thing as ‘one Asia’, and that security varies across the region. As one participant put it, referring to a recent Foreign Policy article, there are two Asias, one ‘Economic Asia’ which is highly dynamic and integrated, and another ‘Security Asia’ with a variety of territorial disputes, rising nationalism and growing distrust. These two Asias no longer run in parallel. Secondly, there are a host of different regional security challenges, and different views about the best strategies to deal with them. Any greater role for the EU as a security actor in Asia must take into account the potentially controversial China-US relationship as well as India’s careful guarding of its strategic autonomy.

Participants also highlighted that, as a result of globalisation, security matters in the region have stability consequences well beyond the region. This conclusion led one Chinese participant to emphasise that nowadays, there is a much stronger nexus between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues in the region, such as in the field of energy or water management.

3.1 Challenges for the EU as a Security Actor in Asia

There was a general consensus that the EU has been, and remains, an important economic and commercial player in the Asian region. In terms of security, however, Indian and Chinese participants highlighted the EU’s strategic weakness in its previous dealings with Asian security challenges. Individual member states have considerable military presence in the region. Examples include military dialogues, joint exercises, arms sales, technology transfers, Asian participation in the Galileo global navigation satellite system, French military deployments in the Indian Ocean, and British participation in the Five Power Defense Arrangement. Nonetheless, China and India, remain doubtful about the EU’s military capacity, and are reluctant to accept a greater EU role as a security actor in Asia.

According to Indian and Chinese participants, this assessment is largely due to the complexity of security challenges in Asia and the EU’s lack of research capacity which would enable it to grasp Asian perceptions of security challenges. In the case of disputes in South Asia, for example, India believes in bilateralism and would be reluctant to accept any kind of EU intervention or mediation. One participant cited the 2001-02 India-Pakistan standoff, which saw Indian annoyance at the involvement of EU member states in persuading it not to go to war. Likewise, any greater involvement of the EU in Chinese security matters would have to carefully acknowledge the prerogative of US-China relations first; China’s economic and military preponderance in Asia; as well as the delicate balance of intra-Asian power relations, above all the India-China relationship.
3.2 Opportunities to Strengthen the EU Role in Asian Security

Discussions also aimed to identify ways and areas for the EU to engage further with China and India. Summarising the discussion so far, one European participant concluded that in order to do justice to the ‘two Asias’, the EU needs to overcome a one-dimensional view of Asia solely as a region of vast economic opportunities, and must realise the importance of security, especially in South Asia. However, aside from Afghanistan and severe future security challenges, the EU cannot act as an ‘offshore balancer’ in Asia in the same way as the US, and would encounter reluctance from Asian powers if it sought to do so.

The EU should focus on its existing strengths, including in non-traditional security areas, and should reorient its strategy as a security actor only where appropriate, i.e. to strike a balance between strategic assertiveness and strategic restraint. The EU could promote the historical experience of its evolution and European peace-keeping efforts more thoroughly in Asia. In that regard, one participant highlighted how the experience of people-to-people contacts and discussions about historical memories involved in Franco-German reconciliation which could act as a blueprint to counteract nationalism and chauvinism in Asia. Moreover, European successes in solving complex governance issues could be applied to similar problems in Asia. For example, the international management of the Brahmaputra and Mekong rivers could be compared to the Danube Commission. As an advocate for effective multilateralism, the EU could also provide more impetus to the building of multilateral institutions in Asia where there is a demand for regulation and where issues of sovereignty can be set aside. The EU should continue and intensify its existing efforts in non-traditional security fields such as climate change, development cooperation, science and technology. This is especially important given the growing nexus between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues in the region. In the military field, it was suggested that the EU should intensify its confidence building measures (CBMs) through joint military exercises, exchange of observers, multi-national trainings, and establishment of communications systems to build mutual trust.

In order to do justice to the ‘two Asias’ the EU needs to overcome the one-dimensional view that sees Asia only as region of vast economic opportunities and realise the importance of security in Asia and change its policy accordingly.
There was a general consensus that the EU is not comparable to the US as a security actor, neither in terms of its military capacity, force projection and foreign policy vision, nor in terms of its willingness and capacity to act as an ‘offshore balancer’. Where the US emphasises the principles of sovereignty and bilateralism in its security relations and is more easily convinced of the need for intervention, the EU focuses on multilateral solutions, stresses the importance of supranational institutions, and usually is extremely reluctant when it comes to the question of intervention. As one Indian participant put it rather bluntly, referring to interventionism: ‘We are all free riders, giving advice to the US. We don’t have to do the dirty work; don’t have to take the responsibility.’ Most participants also agreed that the Indian and Chinese security perspectives are much closer to the US than the EU model. As a consequence, the US model for security in Asia is taken much more seriously by Asian powers and the US figures much more prominently in India’s and China’s foreign policy considerations.

In the view of one Chinese participant, the attempt of the US to promote a stronger role for the EU in Asia was also motivated by the US’s rebalancing strategy. It benefits the US in several ways. First, it broadens the room to manoeuvre for the US by reducing economic dependence on China in the region. Second, expanding strategic partnerships with likeminded actors, such as Japan, it helps to enhance the US ‘hubs and spokes’ alliance system geared towards keeping China in check. Third, integrating the EU in regional security initiatives facilitates making rules in global commons like freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Indian participants also expressed their bewilderment at the lack of clarity of the EU’s strategy as a security actor in Asia, especially compared to the US. For example, one Indian participant raised questions about the EU’s position regarding potential burden-sharing with the US when intervention becomes imminent, or whether there would be a division of work between the EU as a civilian power and NATO as a military actor. Indian participants also lamented the European emphasis on multilateralism and supranational institutions as being opposed to India’s adherence to bilateralism and the principle of sovereignty which also guide US strategic thinking. As a result of this and the EU’s lack of strategic clarity in Asia, India is much more comfortable in its security dealings with the US – and even individual EU member states – than with the EU.

Both, Indian and Chinese participants agreed that there is a need for the EU to position itself more clearly vis-à-vis the US’s strategy in the region and to find areas where it can coordinate its security efforts with the US. In addition, if it wants to be taken more seriously as a security actor in Asia, the EU must develop a clearly-defined security model for Asia and, like the US, must invest in marketing this model as a new message. Referring to India, one European participant remarked that India wants to be seen as more than a big market, but the EU plays little or no role in defence matters or strategic relations.
The role of strategic partnerships in determining the EU’s security relations with India and China is extremely important. There was no common understanding among the participants as to what exactly strategic partnerships are, and whether they have a distinct functionality for bilateral relations or merely describe the rules of bilateral engagement. The term is used in an inflationary way, it lacks conceptual clarity and very often lacks a clear strategy. One participant went as far as asking whether ‘strategic partnership’ is actually a term used more by scholars than by the EU itself. Others maintained that the role of strategic partnerships should not be underestimated. They are more than just a ‘signalling device’ and have the capacity to upgrade bilateral relations qualitatively.

On the one hand, it was argued that strategic partnerships help to strengthen bilateral relations that cannot be accommodated in any other forum (e.g. the EU’s strategic partnerships with Russia or China). Moreover, regulations regarding common goods would be difficult to accomplish without preceding cooperation and agreement within strategic partnerships. On the other hand, strategic partnerships may undermine multilateral negotiations, providing a disincentive for individual partners to cooperate in regional or global fora. The strategic partnerships between India or China and individual EU member states thus have the potential to undermine cooperation at the EU level.

5.1 The EU-India Strategic Partnership: Great Expectations, Lack of Delivery

The discussion focused on the EU-India strategic partnership. Launched almost ten years ago and one of 30 strategic partnerships India has entered into with different partners, the EU-India strategic partnership has yet to take off. Despite great expectations, its lack of delivery, especially in the field of security, was linked to diverging interests and priorities, a lack of commitment, different views on security, a lack of capacity and resources and mutual misperceptions. The partnership still has a mainly economic rationale, with more than 100 of the 400 items of cooperation listed belonging to economic cooperation. In addition, other areas of cooperation remain overshadowed by the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations launched in 2007, the progress of which has been sluggish at best. There has been no deepening on selected issues and no real strengthening of the political dimension of the partnership. As one participant put it, no concrete projects have come into existence so far despite a lot of intentions.
The EU-China strategic partnership is seen as less static than the EU-Indian one, but also lacking in dynamism.

Discussions identified a range of causes: the lack of capacity and resources on the Indian side; the low visibility of the EU in India, especially compared to the diplomatic activities of EU member states; India’s preference for dealing with individual member states; diverging interests of individual EU member states; India’s preference for inter-governmental instead of company-level interaction in the area of defence cooperation; and the fact that the EU has not delivered on crucial security arrangements (e.g. intelligence sharing through EUROPOL). However, the lack of deliverables in the EU-India strategic partnership have deeper causes, including in the realm of perception, in different views on security, and information deficits on both sides. For India, the EU is not a credible security actor, one that is able and willing to exert ‘hard power’. In addition, the EU is largely seen as ‘Europe’ in a general and non-institutionalised sense. The EU, as one participant put it, still has to make up its mind what to expect from a strategic partnership. For example, does the EU see India as a regional leader, a global actor, or merely a trading partner.

Indian participants, however, expressed cautious optimism regarding the future potential of the EU-India strategic partnership, pointing to a qualitative change in cooperation between the EU and India over the past decade. There has been a greater normative convergence, and India is seen as a real partner rather than a development aid recipient. If the FTA can be consolidated and greater knowledgeable constituencies can be created, there are vast opportunities for increased cooperation, especially in maritime security and non-traditional security fields.

5.2 The EU-China Partnership: Deeper but still Facing Challenges

The EU-China strategic partnership was seen as less static than the Indian one, but also lacking in dynamism. Similar to the EU-India partnership, China sees the EU as an effective economic actor, but has doubts about the EU’s credentials as a global security actor. But the ongoing debt crisis challenges the positive view of the EU. This was seen as a dangerous scenario because it threatens the economic foundations of the EU-China partnership, thus endangering future political cooperation. A Chinese participant attributed the operational difficulties in the EU-China strategic partnership to diverging interests of the various EU member states, as well as to differences in the EU and Chinese definition of strategy. Whereas China’s strategic outlook is long-term, comprehensive and principled, the EU’s focus is more on the operational level and on short- to medium-term feasibility. However, China is also limited in its policy options as a result of its internal problems, its governance deficit in the face of a rising and aspiring middle class and growing urbanisation. As in the case of the EU-India partnership, closer cooperation in non-traditional security fields was deemed as a more feasible way forward than traditional security cooperation. The setting up of an EU-China environment union was therefore identified as a desirable as well as manageable mid-term task for the EU-China partnership.
6. ‘Global Security in Action’: Peacekeeping and Export Controls

The conference also provided the opportunity for the NFG Research Group to present and discuss findings of the project’s two case studies: peacekeeping and export controls. NFG researchers Garima Mohan and Olivia Gippner introduced their comparative model of Indian, Chinese and EU approaches to peacekeeping, highlighting particularly the model’s criteria for comparison, i.e., policy decision and operationalisation. The model served as the basis for their six months of field research in India and China where they conducted interviews with decision-makers, academics, security think tank personnel, and Indian army representatives.

NFG researchers Jizhou Zaho and Florian Britsch first provided an overview of the state of research on export controls in China and India, before describing major current multilateral export control regimes, the main actors in the decision-making process of China’s and India’s export control, and recent developments in the countries’ national law and regulation systems. They introduced their interview questionnaires, access to interview partners, and presented preliminary findings with special reference to India’s relationship with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and China’s policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

In the subsequent discussion it was pointed out that, historically, Indian and Chinese views on peacekeeping differed widely, and that the research on peacekeeping should focus not only on current policy decisions on peacekeeping and the actual implementation of peacekeeping missions on the ground, but should also take a historical view. In a comparative model, each actor’s attitude towards R2P could be a test case for further research on Indian and Chinese approaches to peacekeeping. This may also shed light on their acceptance of, or reluctance towards, multilateral negotiations in this area.

“For those of us not familiar with India and the views on international relations by Indian foreign policy elites, this was a fascinating conference. Particularly interesting to me was the enormous perception and knowledge gap between Indian views on the EU, on the one hand, and the assessments by EU scholars, on the other”

— Thomas Risse, Freie Universität Berlin
With reference to the export controls case study, which is based on the hypothesis that there may be a diffusion of international export control norms from the EU to domestic legislation in China and India, questions were raised about the role of external factors. These included pressure exerted by the US to convince China to pursue an enhanced engagement with the DPRK, or to convince India to join international export control regimes. Participants largely agreed that both India and China want to be more visible as responsible global actors in export controls. This opens up the possibility that they would give up any previously-held revisionist agenda, instead acting more as status quo powers willing to deal with, and eventually accept, international norms of nuclear non-proliferation and export controls regarding dual-use goods and technologies. However, participants also agreed that, to date, the EU has made little effort to interact more thoroughly with India or China on export controls (though more interaction took place between China and individual EU member states).

This may be due partly to the fact that both India and China prefer an exchange of views on equal terms rather than being taught by others. Lastly, it was suggested that further research in the area should explore how exactly EU member states have fared in promoting export control norms in India and China. Furthermore, the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports should be scrutinised and contrasted with national arms export control policies, whose modes of decision-making and the actors involved therein deserve further attention.

So far, there has been little effort on behalf of the EU to interact more thoroughly with India or China in the question of export controls.

"The conference offered a necessary platform for Indian and Chinese scholars to communicate their opinions about EU’s role in Asia as a security actor, and we quite quickly realized that our views were very diversified on the issue"

Zhao Chen, CASS
Objective of the event:
To look through Asian views of the EU as a security actor and correct misconceptions about European security policy.

"Thank you for the invitation and the warm welcome.

I am very pleased to join you today on the occasion of this highly interesting event. Before starting, allow me to express my appreciation for ORF, the Jodhpur National University, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, NFG and, lastly, the Free University of Berlin, for organising this initiative to provoke a discussion on EU’s role as a security actor in a multi-polar world. I am certain that we could draw some very useful conclusions on how the EU could contribute more to guaranteeing security in the world and, more specifically, in the region.

I was asked to make a short speech on EU’s role as a security actor in a multi-polar world. I am aware that there is sometimes scepticism in India, as to whether the EU can be considered and treated as a security actor. I should say that this scepticism is probably greater in India than it is in other parts of Asia, and I believe that this is because too often there is confusion between security and defence, which results in security instruments being confused with military hardware. Security instruments are in fact much wider than that, and we can easily illustrate this with reference to Europe’s own history.

Europe’s biggest success is to emerge as an example of stability, co-operation and integration after the catastrophe of World War II. NATO of course played an important role in the context of the Cold War, but what transformed Europe from the battleground which it was for centuries was the process of deep integration that has resulted in the EU. Last year we received the Nobel Peace Prize and it was through recognition of the deepest sense of the European process of integration as a peace project. The security which Europeans enjoy today, security in the most traditional sense of safety from external attack, is a direct result of European integration.

Our historical experience as Europeans, and our genetic experience as members of the European Union, gives us a profound sense of the relevance of non-military instruments of security. I do not wish to say that military instruments are no longer relevant for contemporary security challenges. This is not at all the case. But what I will say is that contemporary security challenges can rarely be addressed through military instruments alone, and this is where we have an experience and a vocation that few others can claim to have.

Security in the European Union is ensured through our deep integration, but the process of responding to security challenges around the world obviously has to have other instruments. Over the almost six decades of evolution since the Treaty of Rome, we have seen a constant process of recognition that our interaction with the external world required the development of new instruments, and the issue of international security is a case in point. By carrying out consecutive institutional reforms over various decades, it has been possible to establish the EU as a security actor with significant contributions around the world.

In a nutshell, the 1992 Treaty of the EU – the Maastricht Treaty – established for the first time a set of principles that guide the EU’s external policies, such as support of democracy and rule of law, human rights and respect of International Law. At the same time, it has defined several ambitious goals for the EU, such as to prevent conflicts, foster sustainable economic growth and promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. Sometime later, in 2003, the European Security Strategy was adopted, introducing the basic philosophical principles of the EU’s security policy. Its significance lies on the fact that it creates a new perception of security in today’s multi-polar and interconnected world, updating our understan-
ding in order to correspond to a greatly changed world. Although traditional security challenges remain, and of course India knows this well, a new series of global challenges and security threats (the spill-over from regional conflicts, terrorism, state failure, organised crime and disease, to name a few) cannot be adequately addressed by military means alone, but require a mixture of military, political and economic tools. Sudan, Afghanistan and Somalia provide some good examples. These principles and concerns were encompassed in the EU’s CFSP and CSDP. In short, one of the strengths of the European approach resides in its ability to combine military, political and diplomatic tools, and it is this that has allowed us to become the decisive actor in various security challenges, especially but not exclusively on the African continent and of course on the European continent as well.

In the meantime the EU continued to evolve, strengthening and deepening our capabilities in the fields of foreign policy and security. In particular, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into effect in 2009, has been a landmark, providing the necessary ingredients for the EU to strengthen its position as a security actor in line with our understanding of security. Our principles and concerns were unchanged, but our institutional capacity was considerably enhanced. In particular I would like to underline, amongst other institutional innovations, the establishment of the post of High Representative and Vice President, currently Baroness Catherine Ashton, and the creation of a full-fledged diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service, with some 3600 personnel in 141 missions around the world.

With regard to new security threats on the ground, conflict and threat prevention lie at the root of the EU’s preferred security policy. Occasionally it is necessary to have emergency security interventions, using military hardware, and I shall return to that in a moment, but the preferred focus of the EU is to address the root causes of conflict and instability by strengthening governance and Human Rights, and by assisting economic development through such means as trade and foreign assistance. Indeed, the EU possesses a considerable repertoire of civilian, ‘soft power’ tools. This is what enables us to play a key role in one of the greatest security-related challenges facing international diplomacy, the EU3+3 on the Iran nuclear issue. We are a major economic power, regardless of current difficulties, and we provide well over than 50% of world’s development aid in the world.

But we do not ignore the fact that in this world military hardware and armed forces also have a role, and over the years the EU has developed considerable capacity in this field. Over the years, in the context of our CSDP, we have completed 13 Missions and operations (among them 3 military and 1 civilian-military). Just by way of illustration allow me to mention:

- Aceh Monitoring Mission. A civilian mission, initially consisted of around 80 people, reduced in 2006 to 36 monitors. It monitored the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement (ASEAN countries, as well as Norway and N. Zealand, contributed to the Mission).
- EUFOR RD Congo. A Military Operation in support of the UN Mission in Congo during the election process (July – November 2006).

Today, the EU is present with 17 Missions and operations, in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, covering a wide range of fields, such as border security, post-conflict reconstruction, security sector reform, judicial and police training and counter-piracy. 4 of these missions are military (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mali, and Somalia on land and at sea). In total we have about 2830 military personnel currently in action, as well as a number of naval vessels and some air capacity. The other 13 on-going Missions are civilian, and among them we find:

- EUPOL Afghanistan (EU Police Mission), which started in 2007, providing policing expertise and supporting police reform. It has 350 international and 200 local staff.
- EUAVSEC South Sudan (started in June 2012). It provides support to strengthening the security at Juba International Airport. When it reaches its full capacity, it will comprise 44 international and 23 local staff.
- EUJUST LEX Iraq, since 2005. It is the EU’s first integrated rule of law Mission.”
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is worthwhile to say a bit more at this point about a field that is of great interest and usefulness for India interest, counter-piracy, where the EU has assumed an important role. The protection of the Gulf Area from piracy is of high importance for Indian interests in terms of trade and for the security of sea-farers (7% of the world’s seafarers are Indian). There is an on-going Counter-Piracy dialogue between the EU and India, and the most recent meeting earlier this month in Brussels was very successful, and both sides are exploring ways of enhancing their co-operation in this area. EU NAVFOR, also known as Operation Atalanta, is the biggest single anti-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean, and it has been ongoing since December 2008. It has been very successful, as can be seen from the numbers. Pirates captured 47 vessels and their crews in 2010. By 2011 the number has reduced, but 25 vessels were still held by pirates. In December 2012 EU NAVFOR registered only 4 ships as captured. Since 2011 the number of hostages dropped from up to 680 to 114 in December 2012. Today we know of only 1 vessel being held, and a total of 54 sailors held hostage. If we look at the number of attacks, we see the same radical decline: 176 attacks in 2011, 35 in 2012 and 3 this year (up to 20 September).

But this is not only about dry numbers. Looking at this year alone there are 24 Indian citizens who are alive because of Operation Atalanta: 10 Indian fishermen were rescued after the sinking of their boat, off the Somali coast, in January; and 14 Indian fishermen were rescued after their dhow was attacked by pirates, in the Gulf of Aden, in June.

Of course, as all of us know, pirates were born on land, and the conditions that allow piracy to happen are conditions on land, in Somalia. That is why the EU is combining Operation Atalanta with a three-pronged strategy for supporting Somalia, including military, diplomatic and economic tools. In military terms we are training the Somali army in camps in Uganda, and they have now been able to return to their own country and progressively increase the area under government control, driving back Al-Shabab and other Islamist radicals. We have now also developed EUCAP Nestor, a mission to promote regional capacity building in the Horn of Africa. This will develop the civilian coastal policing capacity in Somalia and strengthen the coastguard function in Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles and Tanzania. It will also reinforce those countries’ ability to fight piracy and face other challenges such as illegal fishing and trafficking).

Diplomatically we have provided the major pillar of support for the re-establishment of the state in Somalia. We have worked hard to help Somalia establish institutions such as a functioning Parliament, a government, and a legitimately elected President. And economically we have been the major provider of development assistance, and just last week we spearheaded a major international donor conference in Brussels that raised over 2 billion dollars for Somalia.

In case anybody wonders what Somalia has to do with us, the answer is simple: a failed state is a threat not only for the immediate neighbourhood but for the whole world, and Afghanistan was a very clear illustration of this. The consequences of the complete breakdown of authority in Somalia affected all of us, including of course India, and that is why the EU decided to use the full range of its instruments to begin the process, which will necessarily be a lengthy one, to recreate full security in Somalia.
Occasionally one hears questions, both inside and outside of Europe, as to whether the EU can become an efficient and reliable security actor. This questioning usually focuses on the differences between the Member-States, the difficulties in achieving joint action or the impact of the financial and economic crisis. But the facts are a sufficient response to the question. Despite difficulties and problems, the EU has accomplished a remarkable feat, which would have been unthinkable 50 or 40 years ago: to unite 28 countries, which in various instances have powerful individual voices, and cooperate closely to export security at a global level. Moreover, the EU has in several cases shown an extraordinary ability to overcome obstacles in the past, through trial and error, reforms and cooperation. I am certain that this process will continue. In this light, I believe that the EU will continue to evolve as a significant security actor.

The notion of security in an emerging globalised and multi-polar world encompasses new threats and challenges, and there is certainly much scope for strengthening the co-operation between the EU and new important actors in international relations, such as India and China. They could expand their co-operation to achieve common goals in international fora on global and regional issues of common interest. They could also work together in areas of high importance, such as peace-keeping, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. And they could find common ways and share ideas for dealing with a wide range of global threats, such as natural disasters, environmental degradation or terrorist networks. As the example of European integration has shown, different experiences and ideas can produce remarkable results if the actors decide to share responsibility, find areas of convergence and work together to address common challenges. I believe that EU, India and China can do more to tackle new threats and promote peace in a new multi-polar world. “

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