Chinese Perceptions of Europe before 1949
Perspectives from the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
Dr. Ines Eben von Racknitz

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Abstract

This paper analyses, whether history and culture from pre-1911 China influence and shape China-EU policy today. It argues that although the People`s Republic of China claims to have turned a page after 1949, some diplomatic traditions with respect to Europe are still valid. Instead of only making broad assumptions about the nature of these traditions, it is recommended to analyze more closely the perceptions of Chinese and European agents alike, but focus particularly on the Chinese agents and on the “contact zones” in which the mutual European-Chinese perceptions were coined. It will be the research in the field of diplomatic strategy combined with personal experiences of Chinese and European agents that will turn out the most notable results in this somewhat underresearched but vital field of international history.

The Author

Dr. Ines Eben von Racknitz is a Visiting Fellow at the NFG Research Group ‘Asian Perceptions of the EU’. She studied sinology, comparative literature and religious studies in Leipzig, Beijing, Berlin and Stanford University. She graduated with an Magister Artium in sinology from Freie Universität Berlin. At the University of Konstanz she was a member of the research group “Dynamics of transnational agency“ and graduated with a PhD in history. Currently, she holds a post as a lecturer in the department of history at Nanjing University. Her research interests are in Chinese history and the history of China’s international relations.

Key Words

China-EU cultural relations, Chinese-European contact zones, Chinese perceptions of Europe and the West, Europe-China, International relations, history
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1. Introduction

1.1 Question, theory and method

Do lessons from history influence and form the Chinese elite’s perceptions of the EU today, and which role does culture play? How do these historical influences shape the way in which Chinese policy with the EU and the Western powers is carried out? Do they not play a role at all?

These are valid questions, particularly since it is often repeated that the recurrence of history plays an increasingly important role in interpreting China’s role in the world and thus seems to shape Chinese foreign policy. In this paper, I will argue that although lessons from history might not directly influence the day-to-day political decisions in the realms of China-EU relations, important stations of a “shared history” between Europe and China are still reflected in the background and need to be taken into account.

Among these important elements are for example things like the “traditionally good relations” between Germany (evoked from the special form of German colonialism in China), institutions of higher education founded by Europeans in China, or even the positive personal experiences of Chinese agents in Europe. It can thus be argued, that on the micro level, individual actors influenced perceptions, while on the macro level, wider strategic interactions, wars etc. influenced Chinese perceptions of Europe.

Several major issues and problems arise particularly with the topics of history and culture and their shaping of the Chinese perception of the EU.

Firstly, there is a reason why the history of China-EU relations never considers the historical situation before 1949. Then, when the European Union was founded and searched for ways with which to represent itself in the world, China had evolved into a new society, in which none of the old diplomatic rules seemed to apply anymore. Part of this new China’s foreign policy was certainly to shape the post-revolutionary political relations in a new way that had nothing to do with Republican China or even Qing-China.

Secondly, it remains difficult to determine whether history and culture have such an important role in foreign policy, or whether the Chinese elites, who frame this foreign policy, really look to history and culture for guidance in the process of decision making. Although traditions and longstanding relations are always evoked, the day-to-day decisions in the realms of foreign policy are usually a question of “rational choice”. China persists in dealing with the European countries in a multipolar system rather than in a European Union, and this seems to greatly influence, how the Chinese elites, as well as the general population, see Europe: Europe is perceived as an entity, but European history and culture exist as very cloudy ideas and concepts. In terms of culture, knowledge about Europe as a whole is very selective: France and Germany are very well known, particularly for their history and culture (and Germany also for the support of China in

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1 I would like to thank the NFG Research Group “Asian perceptions of the EU” at Freie Universität Berlin for the invitation as Visiting Fellow during Nov/Dec 2012, the hospitality and the great discussions. My thanks go also to two anonymous reviewers of this paper.

2 With some exceptions, for example Yahuda 2008, in: Shambaugh, David/Sandschneider, Eberhard/ Zhou Hong (ed.) 2008: Chapter 1. In his small volume The European Union and China, for example, Richard Grant leaves historical factors out, so does Shambaugh 1996:3, who starts his historical account of Europe-China relations in the year 1949.
the 1930s), and that goes also for Great Britain (with its long colonial history in China) and most of the countries who used to have extended economic interests and a colonial presence in China and it seems, that the other countries of the European Union are hardly recognized in China. This is certainly also connected to the fact, that the aforementioned EU member states do adopt different positions on relations with China.

The third problem is a general problem that arises whenever history and culture are evoked as determinants of foreign policy: The historical events that are chosen and used are of course always selected and represent just one aspect of reality. Which parts of history and culture are highlighted and cited as an example is usually determined by the actual politicians and rulers. In the case of China, this can be easily demonstrated with the example of the academic field of World history that has come back into fashion since the ‘Opening of China’ to the world in the mid 1980s by Deng Xiaoping. A notion of World history has existed in China since the 1920s, but changed, along with all other historical research, throughout the 20th century, influenced by political events. During Republican China, historical research was more and more carried out in the framework and under the auspices of Marxist theory. History, and also World history became a political instrument for the formation of a new “political and social awareness” of Chinese society and the political legitimization of the newly rising communist party during the 1920s and 1930s was created in the new interpretation of recent historical events. Especially after the founding of the People’s republic of China in 1949 the results of historical research were more and more subordinated under the political line of the party.

The beginning of the Deng-Era in the mid-80s saw a change of paradigms of political legitimation of power in China. Since that time, the Communist party exchanged the orthodox socialist economic mode with that of state-sponsored capitalism. Changing political circumstances are also changing the perceptions of the own history and the paradigms of questions and research. In the wake of the political developments in the mid 80s and the ensuing economic prosperity, the leaders of China turned to “materialism” as the doctrine of the day. The political legitimacy of the Chinese government, hitherto based on paradigms of change and revolution, was now based on the PRC’s claim to represent the continuation of a rich and successful historical Chinese Empire. Whereas in the era before and after 1949, China used world history to compare her own standing in the world with that of other countries in terms of development and power, academic research is now turning to world history to look for examples on how to obtain economic strength and prosperity. It is under these considerations that there is a great interest in, for example, German history in general. Germany’s history as a story of success is very attractive for a Chinese audience. Also, there is a renewed interest in the Qing Empire, as shown by the establishment of an Institute of Qing history at Renmin University.

3 On Britain in China see: Bickers 1999. There are many books on the relations between France and China, Germany and China and Great Britain and China, but hardly books on the relations between China and Romania or Poland or Estonia.


5 For the early phases of Marxist theory in history in China please refer to Dirlik 1978: Part II.

6 For the changes of paradigms of Chinese historiography see: Wang 2008: 791, and Barmé 1993: 260 ff. The renewed question in the own Imperial past finds it expression in projects like the reconstruction of the Yuanming yuan, one of the most splendid residences of the Qing emperors at the outskirts of Beijing. Another question of importance in this context is the one for the future role, that China should play in the world, and for example which values it should distribute.
of China in Beijing? As the 21st century started, TV miniseries set in the Qing dynasty were booming in popular culture, as well as shows set in earlier Imperial dynasties.

1.2 Arguments for the use of history and culture to study the Chinese perceptions of Europe

Before we discard the idea of history and culture influencing decision making processes in Chinese foreign policy altogether, a few points should be added and taken into consideration. The existence of a rich historical experience and a vivid awareness of it are definitely not enough to make the bond of a modern Chinese foreign policy to history and tradition credible. But by now we know – particularly in the case of China –, that it can be safely assumed that the influence of state ideology in foreign policy during the times of Mao was often overestimated. It seems that a rather ancient doctrine of state is still in effect, and current policy in China cannot be understood without this background, and this also goes for foreign policy: Although China itself claimed to have turned a page in 1949, China has always had rather strong ties with the world, and there are still several traditions in place. It really needs to be emphasized, that China’s self-opening in the present was not the awakening of a sleeping giant, recently tormented by a Maoist nightmare. Rather, she presently finds her orientation in a century-long history. As John K. Fairbank put it: “To deal with a major power without regards for its history, and especially its tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying blind.” What does this mean with respect to Europe and Chinese elite perceptions of Europe?

For one, we should look at the rank of importance Europe held in the estimation of China: Europe was always a part of a “Chinese cosmology”, or a Chinese world order, but the Chinese government always regarded its relations with Central Asia as more important. The importance of an Inner Asian strategy during the early Qing times took precedence over the threat from the Sea that came from Portuguese, Dutch or British warships at the Chinese coast. Even after the second Opium war, Qing strategic thinking still regarded the Inner Asian frontier as more important than the maritime frontier. On the other hand, whenever the Chinese government entered in relations with Europe, there

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7 This project was endowed with roughly 100 million US Dollar and has the assignment, to rewrite the history of the Qing Empire, also to collect foreign language materials about the history of the Qing Empire. See also Mao Liping, Ma Zhao 2012: 367-374.
8 Osterhammel 1989:390. Osterhammel argues, that quite often, the fact is overlooked, that the actual practice of foreign policy often belied propagandistic pronouncements. These propagandistic pronouncements were mainly for the sake of the domestic public and even Mao Zedong, in Western eyes the ideologist par excellence, rarely hesitated to sacrifice parts of his doctrine, it was for the better.
10 Fairbank 1969:450.
12 When Li Hongzhang in 1875 wanted to build naval strength against Japan’s influence in Korea, Zuo Zongtang wanted instead to finance his expedition to defeat rebels and keep Russia out, three thousand miles to the west. The Court decided in favor of Zuo, as against Li Hongzhang and the Japanese menace. Fairbank 1969:453.
seemed to have always been a kind of learning attitude towards Europe. This of course does not go for the entire Qing dynasty. But two periods stand out: the early Qing years, during which the Chinese government regarded the technologies and novelties of the Jesuit missionaries (for example in the military realm) as useful tools, and the late 19th century, when statesmen like Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan put forward the idea that China needed to learn from European, or rather Western technology, in order to succeed in its own quest for modernization.\(^{15}\)

From the Chinese perspective, however, only the foreign relations of early years of the Qing-Dynasty (1644-1911) were regarded as relations with Europe (as opposed to the 19th century, where China dealt with different European nations): the main contact to Europe were the Jesuit missionaries, and their main affiliation was perceived by the Chinese emperors through their monastic order rather than their country, thus the idea of Europe.\(^{14}\) The same applies for the idea of China in Europe: thanks to both the reports of the Jesuit missionaries and the Dutch and Russian trade missions, Europe in the era of enlightenment had a rather clear concept of China (I will follow up on that later) and even integrated some philosophical discourses allegedly Chinese into their own philosophical discourses (e.g. human rights, law, education).\(^{15}\) There were no formal diplomatic relations: European traders and missionaries were included in a rather open Chinese world order and treated like all “friends from afar”. The image of Europe presented by the Jesuit missionaries to the emperors of Qing China was so positive, that centuries later the Chinese student movement of 1919 would be known as “era of enlightenment” in Chinese history. In this term, the European era of enlightenment, well known to the Chinese literati and students, is resonant, and thus be the memory of this era (among many others) plays a particularly important role in the Chinese elite’s perception of Europe.\(^{16}\)

As the 18th century progressed, however, these Western foreigners in China became fewer in number, and the infamous meeting of Lord Macartney with the old Qianlong emperor in 1793, where the Qianlong emperor refused to take up trade with Britain is often seen as the first sign of a China in decline.\(^{17}\)

Chinese perception of Europe changed after 1842, thus mirroring the historical changes in Europe since the French revolution in 1789. During the first Opium War in 1842, Great Britain forced the Chinese government to open 5 treaty ports to Western trade. At that time, the Chinese government perceived Europe rather as a conglomeration of countries (nations, Empires) with great cultural and historical diversity, than an entity. Understandably: whereas the Christian missionaries of earlier times presented themselves as united in one church, after 1842 England, France, the United States, Russia, Germany and even the Netherlands all demanded separate treaties with the Qing government. The second opium war 1856 to 1860 deepened in the Chinese government the

\(^{13}\) Wright 1957:196ff.  
\(^{14}\) For the strategies of e.g. the Jesuit order see Brockey 2007.  
\(^{15}\) Spence 1998:81ff, elaborates on the philosophical discourses led by Leibniz and Montesquieu originating from their interest in China.  
\(^{16}\) For a discussion of the term “enlightenment” in connection with the Movement of May 4th 1919, see Fang 2006: 43ff.  
\(^{17}\) James Hevia interprets this whole encounter as a massive misunderstanding, Hevia 1995.
impression of rather diverse nations in Europe. After British and French troops burned down the Yuanming Yuan, palace and pleasure grounds of the Qing emperors in 1860, the signing of the convention of Beijing in the same year allowed Western powers to take up diplomatic residences in Beijing. Chinese officials were quick to realize that the European countries, as well as the United States, Russia and Japan, all followed different aims and trajectories in their relations with China and acted accordingly.¹⁸

This has been linked with a tradition diplomatic tactic of playing out the powers against each other.¹⁹ After 1860 this became particularly important, when the most-favored nation clause was eliminated from the treaties with Beijing. Up until then, all rights and privileges granted to one power were transferred to all Western nations. The abandoning of this clause meant the beginning of competition among the foreign powers in dealing with China, and the development image of Europe was not that of a unitary entity any more, but dominated by individual nation states.

The end of the Qing-Dynasty in 1911 and the founding of the Republic of China in 1912 transformed China’s role in the world as well as her perception of Europe, the United States and Japan. A new Chinese bourgeois elite who had rather clear perceptions of European countries and the US was formed (mainly in the cities of Shanghai and Beijing), since some of the members of this bourgeoisie had obtained their university degrees there and had thus spent several years in these countries. Particularly Germany and the United States were regarded as allies in the Republican era.²⁰

But since the framework of historical reference for the Chinese perception of Europe usually goes back further than Republican China, this working paper focuses on the aforementioned two phases of heightened contact with Europe during Qing-times 1644-1911.

Assuming that there is an influence of history and culture on Chinese elite perceptions of Europe today, how can we measure it? John King Fairbank, for example, searched for an answer to this question in three major diplomatic traditions (obviously perceived as cultural traditions) of the Qing government that seemed to have determined China’s handling of the European powers in the 20th century (the strategic primacy of Inner Asia, the disesteem of sea power and the doctrine of China’s superiority) and asked which of these traditions still remain in actual foreign policy.²¹ These investigations show rather clearly on a macro historic level what Europe’s position among all other issues of Chinese foreign policy was, as well as the background, in which some decisions are being made.

On a micro level, however, it is usually not a diffuse image of Europe that determines China’s perception of it. Involved are rather agents whose personal experiences with Europeans make up the Chinese perceptions of Europe, which is, why I also follow in this paper an actor centered approach.²² So, who was in direct contact with Europeans and traveled between China and Europe during late Qing times and would actually have

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¹⁸ For a detailed analysis of the Second Opium war 1856-1860 see Wong 1998.

¹⁹ Crossley/Siu/Sutton (ed.) 2006:79 ff. elaborate particularly on Manchu centralization of power and foreign relations.


²¹ Of course it has to be taken into account, that Fairbank is arguing from a perspective of 1969.

²² Osterhammel 1989:393.
personal experiences? Much has been published on this issue: the relations between China and Europe during Qing times are a rather large field of research, and many books already exist.\textsuperscript{23} The focus, however, was on how European agents viewed China. Rarely do we hear personal testimonies from the Chinese agents regarding Europe who actually handled international affairs. This is rather understandable in the early Qing times, when there were a lot more Europeans in China than Chinese in Europe.\textsuperscript{24} But during the late Qing-times, and particularly after 1871, more and more Chinese travelled abroad and returned. Their perceptions, I feel, have so far not yet been properly evaluated.\textsuperscript{25} Since the middle of the 19th century, people travelling abroad came from very different strata of Chinese society: there were coolie workers, diplomats, merchants or political activists like Sun Yatsen.\textsuperscript{26} But not only experiences with Europe or Europeans outside of China shaped the Chinese perceptions. Also, Europeans inside China were coming from all different classes of European society. Not just missionaries, merchants or diplomats travelled, but also private tourists, journalists and women arrived then, and European settlements came into existence. Chinese perceptions of Europe could thus be formed in “contact zones” in China.\textsuperscript{27} 

I would like here to sum up my introduction in the questions, that I would like to address in this working paper: How, through which agents was Europe represented in China and where were the contact zones? And then: who were the Chinese agents, at home and abroad, in contact with Europeans, whose experiences coined the perceptions of Europe? A broad outline of ideas will be given, by dividing the Qing-era in two periods, early and late Qing, thus also showing the changes of these perceptions. During the late Qing-era, particular consideration will be given to the Chinese students, who went to Europe, for they usually returned to take up important posts in China. This working paper sketches out broad lines of investigation that would lead eventually to a more profound project and research.


\textsuperscript{24} Apart from Michael Alphonsius Shen Fu-tsong, a Chinese christian convert from Nanjing, who was brought to France by Philippe Couplet and introduced at the court of Louis XIV, he died in 1691 on his way back to China in Mozambique. Fan Shouyi (1682-1753) was the only one who travelled to Europe and returned to write about it. For more info see Eliseeff-Poisle, in: Lee (ed.) 1991:154 and Masini, in: Neder/Roetz/ Schilling 2001: 568.

\textsuperscript{25} An exception is e.g. Catherine Vance Yeh 2007.

\textsuperscript{26} Iris Chang describes the history of Chinese settlers from all strata of society in the US in the 19th century, Chang 2003.

\textsuperscript{27} Some of them mentioned in Schoenbauer Thurin 1999. I borrow the term ”contact zone” from Mary Louise Pratt, who coined it to refer to ”...the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish onhooing relations(…)”, Pratt 1992:6.
2. The Qing-Empire: Friends from afar (1640-1840s)

2.1 Self perception of the Qing-Empire and her international relations.

In the 17th and 18th century, the Manchurian Qing dynasty that reigned over China was at the height of its power and success. The government had a strong centralized and competent civil service and was supported by a scholar-gentry class that formed an elite of Confucian literati. The three Qing-emperors Kangxi (1672-1722), Yongzheng (1723-1735) and Qianlong (1736-1795) expanded the borders of Chinese territory to the greatest extent since the Han-Empire and brought with large military campaigns in the 1700s Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia and Tibet under Chinese domination. Since the Han-Dynasty, China had been the most powerful country in East Asia. Geographical boundaries and basic means of transport kept China apart from other "advanced civilizations", and China consequently developed a self-centered world-view. At least until the beginning of the 19th century, the "world" for the Qing-emperors consisted of "Everything under the sky": there were no borders and there was no need to recognize other states as equal.

Most surrounding states or kingdoms accepted the Chinese superiority and bowed to this view of the world. They were organized according to a principle of huayiguan in "tributary states" and in "mutual trading states". A tributary state was a "vassal state" or "subject state" that paid tributes at regular intervals. Also the European states had a place in this system and were actually considered "mutual trading states". Although they were not expected to pay tributes, the Qing government still treated them as "vassal states", referring to them as a group of subjects. In the 18th century, the success of the Qing Dynasty in dealing with foreign peoples was based on a differentiated and flexible foreign policy and the application of a broad diplomatic "instrumentarium". This enabled the Qing-emperors, to integrate almost all Asian peoples. The Manchu-emperors unified China by decentralization of power and demanded from their peoples not loyalty to China, but loyalty to the family of the Aixin Gioro. They also created artificially new ethnic identities and awarded high offices to local princes, thus including them into their system, and accepted indigenous religions. Resistance against this imperial expansion was met with great severity. Western merchants, who had been confined with their trade to the Southern fringes of the Empire became also part of this system and were dealt with accordingly. Part of this foreign policy by the Qing government was a specific, targeted openness to foreign technologies. These were integrated as long as they enabled the Qing to increase their power, for example the astro-


31 I am following in this the so-called school of New Qing History, characterized best in: Waley-Cohen 2004: 193–206. For the flexible diplomatic handling of the Dutch and Portuguese according to need, see Wills 1984:179.

32 See also: Crossley (ed.) 2006:10 ff.
nomenclature knowledge of the European Jesuit missionaries Verbiest, Trigault and Semedo.\textsuperscript{33}

2.2 Representation of Europe in China: Jesuit missionaries and early diplomatic trade missions

How was Europe represented in this system? Only Russia had, via Siberia, a trade agreement with China with the treaty of Nercinsk since 1689.\textsuperscript{34} Almost no Chinese travelled abroad until the middle of the 19th century apart from the Jesuit converts Michael Alphonsus Shen Fuzong and Fan Shouyi.\textsuperscript{35} Whereas Shen Fuzong never returned to China, Fan Shouyi brought back to China the first eyewitness report from Europe, the Shenjian lu (translation: Notes about Facts which I personally saw). He spent over 12 years in Europe (from 1708 to 1720), was ordained a priest and learned Latin. Federico Masini, however, is certain that this report of Fan Shouyi had no influence on the Chinese perception of Europe at all since the manuscript had not been published .\textsuperscript{36}

Between 1655 and 1793, a total of 17 Western diplomatic missions arrived in China for reasons of trade (Russian, Dutch, Portuguese).\textsuperscript{37} All of them adhered to Chinese customs and performed the kowtow, but none settled permanently.\textsuperscript{38} Whereas their reports were an important source of information about China for Europe, they left no permanent impression in China, at least not at the Imperial court.

Among Chinese elites, Europe, or rather an imagination thereof, was during the late Ming and mid-to high-Qing rather represented by catholic missionaries. Three generations can be distinguished among these missionaries: the first generation of Portuguese missionaries arrived in the middle of the 16th century in the South of China and stayed mainly at Macao. They did not speak Chinese and reached only converts in the south of China. The Italian Jesuit missionaries Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), also belonging to this generation, studied Chinese and were also able to convert some Chinese to Christianity and laid also the groundwork for the next generation of Jesuit missionaries, who were to have rather an influence at the Qing court.\textsuperscript{39}

After the change of the dynasties in 1644, the Qing emperors invited the Jesuit missionaries to become part of the newly established Qing court and share their knowledge

\textsuperscript{33} Brockey 2007:75ff.
\textsuperscript{34} Quested 1984:11.
\textsuperscript{35} Michael Alphonsius Shen Fuzong, a Chinese Christian convert from Nanjing, who was brought to France by Philippe Couplet and introduced at the court of Louis XIV, died in 1691 on his way back to China in Mozambique. Shen Fuzong has been painted by Sir Godfrey Kneller in 1687. Mungello 2013:92
\textsuperscript{36} Fan Shouyi (1682-1753) was the only one who travelled to Europe and returned to write about it. For more info see Eliseeff-Poisle, in: Lee (ed.) 1991:154 and Masini, in: Neder/ Roetz/ Schilling 2001: 568.
\textsuperscript{37} Osterhammel 1998:46 ff about the delegation with John Bell in China. John E. Wills describes in great detail two Dutch and two Portuguese embassies arriving at the court of the Kangxi-emperor between 1666 and 1687. He also concludes, however, that the Dutch and Portuguese trade was simply not as important as the Mongols and the Russians. Wills 1984:180.
\textsuperscript{38} Zhang Xiaomin, Xu Chunfeng, 2007: 414.
\textsuperscript{39} Lach 1968:794 ff.
of medicine and technology. In the 18th century a French generation of missionaries arrived in China, sent by King Louis XIV. Among them were Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730) and Louis Le Comte (1655-1728). The integration of the French Jesuit missionaries was rather apparent under the Qianlong emperor, who integrated an ensemble of Western-style buildings. From 1773 on, the Jesuit missionaries were banned from the court of Beijing.  

2.3 Chinese Agents and Contact Zones

The few Chinese travelers to Europe in the early and high Qing-times were already mentioned, and it was established that their influence in China was minimal, confined to the larger cities of China. It was thus in China that a Chinese elite was able to obtain knowledge about Europe. Not many Chinese came into direct contact with the European missionaries. Apart from the land trade with Russians, European trade was confined to Canton: it was thus mainly the Cohong-merchants of Guangzhou, organized in guilds, who came in contact with the Europeans.  

The Chinese emperor and his officials, however, were in contact with the Jesuit missionaries, and particularly the Kangxi emperor had a close relationship with them. We also know of Chinese converts to Christianity in the late Ming and the early Qing times, but it is not sure, whether they connected their Christianity to European culture (apart from the missionaries coming from Europe.  

Before coming back to my main argument, let us look briefly into the other direction, the image of China in 18th century Europe: Probably in no other time in European history has the image of China (in this case filtered by the Christian missionaries), apart from the 20th century, influenced Europe as much as during the era of enlightenment. Concerning this problem however, we need to bear two points in mind. Firstly: the catholic missionaries always reported back to Europe with a certain underlying interest: they needed to prove that China was worthy of Christian mission, and that they would, true to the Jesuit assignment, help spread Christianity in the world. Europe, on the other hand, was after the catastrophe of the 30-years war in need of a new example of rulership and state, and it has been assumed, that European thinkers used the reports of the Jesuit missionaries as their role models and example. This perception of China in Europe during the 17th and 18th can clearly be seen in the realms of art, but also in philosophy and literature. It was the first time China was studied in academia, and although it resulted in “Chinoiserie” or a China fashion in the arts, it has been recognized as a “protosinology.”

40 All Western missionaries were banned from China since 1724 by the Yongzheng emperor, because of the rites controversy and of his fear, that they would interfere in international relations. Up to 1773, some Jesuit missionaries were allowed to stay in a scientific advisory capacity. Ku 2001:41.

41 Mungello 2013:7.

42 For more information on Ferdinand Verbiest see Witek 1994.

43 The works of Dominik Sachsenmaier show this quite clearly: Sachsenmaier 2002.

44 The term “protosinology” was coined by David Mungello, who uses it to describe the new field of China-studies that emerged in the 17th century in Europe. Mungello 1985:14. Lach/Van Kley 1993:1675 list
3. Recognizing and adapting to an international community: 1842-1911

3.1 Self-perception of the Qing Empire and its international relations

In 1842, the British forced the Qing-Empire to open 5 more treaty ports along the Chinese coast for European and Western trade. Although this was the first step of the European powers into China, the most important event was the second Opium War 1857/8 and the signing of the Beijing convention in 1860, which altered the relationship between China and Europe forever. The Beijing convention allowed the European powers to establish diplomatic representations in Beijing, and furthermore opened China to Western inland trade. Qing-China, although still rather strong, did not possess in 1860 the necessary means to deny the demands of the Western powers since it was under pressure from all sides. During the early years of the 19th century, the government had focused more and more on internal problems and difficulties, the tributary system had eroded, and conflicts in the border areas and central Asia arose. Chinese military was thus concentrated in these areas rather than at the coasts, which meant that the allied British and French troops were this time able to defeat the Qing army. China was forced not only to recognize the European powers as equal, but also to adapt to (or integrate into its own traditions) European forms of diplomacy and tolerate the establishment of Western institutions. China had to recognize the European “Westphalian” system of states and Empires, along with international law and diplomatic customs. The government reacted by founding a Zongli Yamen, whose sole duty consisted in the handling of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the government was able to resist a full “westernization”, thus differing from Japan, which, during the years of the Meiji-Restauration, replaced large parts of the old Japanese system with a Western system. Also, Chinese attitude toward the Western powers in this phase and before 1895 was not in open opposition with the foreigners. Rather, Chinese elites adapted carefully and selectively, exercising traditional strategies of defense in the dealings with foreigners and always remained in charge. The former ideas and ideals of the Chinese ruling elite gave way to a more pragmatic approach, and the enlightened Chinese intellectuals gradually began to change their views on the West and even became interested in Western technology.

Zeng Guofang and Li Hongzhang were among the most important statesmen who suggested to use Western technology in a “self-strengthening movement” to restore the former power of China. They represented only a small part of the Chinese elite that was open to foreign education and technology, but suggested to send Chinese students abroad to be trained

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46 Journalism was only one part of it, albeit a very interesting one: Vittinghoff 2001. More important were the customs service in Shanghai, police and a system of justice.
47 Gerrit Gong notes, that, as soon as Japan gained recognition by the Western nations to be a „ civilized power “ according to their standards, this European standard of civilization took its place as a universally valid principle. Gong 1984:29.
48 This has been described as „Informal Empire“, see Osterhammel 1986.
49 Zhang Xiaomin, Xu Chunfeng 2007: 419.
in Western military technology and science in Europe and the United States.\(^{50}\)

In 1871, the first Chinese educational mission, consisting of 120 Chinese boys (most of them orphans) set sail under the supervision of Yung Wing, himself the first graduate from Yale for the United States, and remained there for 9 years.\(^{51}\) The educational mission was only partly a success, and the conservative party at the Qing court remained suspicious about the boys and young men, who returned in the early 1880ies.

From 1895 on, China became the object of Great powers, fighting over her resources. The Japanese invasion of 1895 destroyed the politics of cooperation with the foreigners.\(^{52}\) From this time on, China had lost almost all sovereignty in its decisions and was open for the “scramble of concessions”. For example in 1898, China had to lease Kiaotschou to Germany, who was interested in a “German Hong Kong”. The most important incident with the European powers was certainly the Boxer war in 1900, where the European powers again united to punish China for her attempt to evict them.\(^{53}\)

In 1911 the Qing dynasty was overthrown and the Republic of China was founded by Sun Yatsen. This heralded in a new era which will be discussed briefly further below.

### 3.2 Representations of Europe and the United States in China—Contact Zones

After 1860, the possibilities to form a first-hand opinion about foreigners in China itself grew immensely and since the 1870s, a great variety of Europeans, also US-Americans, took up their residence in China. Among them there were many merchants, as Western economic interests were further implemented at the coast.\(^{54}\) But also Christian missionaries, for example, with the China Inland mission since 1865, expanded into the interior of China and built hospitals, schools and orphanages.\(^{55}\)

Particularly the inhabitants of Shanghai witnessed the Europeans settle and did get to know the different styles of Western imperialism and ways of life and realized, that, rather than a unified Europe, all nations that made up Europe differed, according to the customs of their countries, in terms of goals, ideologies and intensities.\(^{56}\) More and more European institutions made it possible to acquire European knowledge in China. In 1863, the Guang Fangyangyuan was established in Shanghai, which was a school for Western languages and sciences, and German was taught in China since 1871.\(^{57}\) The perception of the Europeans in China or among Chinese elites, however, was mixed. On the one side was the elite’s wish to learn from the Europeans and profit for the modernization of

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\(^{50}\) In general on the topic: Wright 1957.

\(^{51}\) Bieler 2004: 9.

\(^{52}\) Osterhammel, 1989: 203.


\(^{54}\) Osterhammel 1989:153.

\(^{55}\) Austin describes the work of the China Inland Mission in late Qing society. Austin 2007.

\(^{56}\) Osterhammel 1989: 398.

\(^{57}\) Staiger 2004:4.
China. Among the population of China, on the other hand, resistance against the foreigners grew, particularly against the missionaries, which is exemplified by the incident in Tianjin in 1870, and reached its peak in the boxer revolt.58

### 3.3 Chinese agents in Europe

At the same time, the possibility of creating a first-hand impression of Europe grew as well for China. The impressions from overseas brought back to China between 1860 and 1911 stemmed mainly from political delegations or Chinese university students, who went to study abroad. A minor group, who was actually not given a voice, were the coolies, who went to the United States to dig in the gold mines and work, but they left hardly any written source materials.59 In July 1866, a first delegation representing the Chinese government traveled to Europe. The delegation visited the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany. The head of the delegation, Bin Chun, as well as another delegation member, Zhang Deyi, recorded their impressions of Europe, and their memories were the first and decisive Chinese records about the European West.60 Zhang was to travel to Europe on eight other times. The first Chinese embassy to Germany opened in Berlin in 1877, and in 1876 and 1877 a first group of Chinese students travelled to Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

The Chinese students going abroad to study in Europe and the United States from 1871 on were of course the main witnesses of Western life and were able to comment freely, and they also returned to China to tell their stories. Japan also held a big attraction, since it had seemingly managed the transition to modernity in under thirty years and was thus a role model for China in the early years.61

However after 1896 and the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese war, Chinese intellectuals began to show great interest in Western ideas rather than in Japan and the returned students from the USA played an increasingly important role in the creation of a new China.62 A second wave of students came to different European countries, among them Great Britain and Russia.63

Although to these days many European universities and Institutes are quite proud of their Chinese alumni, there does not seem to be a comprehensive overview of the history of Chinese students in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. Exceptions are Germany and France, so some general remarks can be made with respect to their percep-

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58 Biggerstaff 1935. The Tianjin incident in 1870 involved attacks on catholic priests and nuns: the Chinese population in Tianjin believed, that Chinese children were blinded and mistreated in the catholic orphanages. The incident ended only, after several nuns and priests were killed and catholic churches burned down. For the boxers see: Cohen 1997.

59 Chang 2003:33.

60 Staiger 2004:5.

61 For Chinese students in Japan see Harrell 1992.


tion of Europe. Comparing the experiences of the Chinese students in France and in Germany, it is clear that they had remarked rather on peculiarities of a country than on Europe and choose their “host country” with specific aims and intentions. Until 1911, for example, 114 Chinese students studied at German universities. Germany had during these times in China a high reputation for military technology and hard sciences (and the reformed universities in Prussia), so most of the Chinese students were involved in military studies or at military academies. But also many students who later went on to become famous law professors, and students who studied education and became university directors, graduated during this time in Germany, among them the famous Cai Yuanpei, who was to be the director of Beijing university.

Students went to France to study engineering and philosophy and were, as well as students in Russia much more likely to come into contact with political activism. Among them was for example Deng Xiaoping, who was a founding member of the association of young Chinese communists in France. Chinese students were also interested in the British university system of Oxford and Cambridge, since the British had also a rather strong presence in China. The first Chinese graduated in 1855 in Edinburgh, and the first Chinese to be admitted to the bar is Wu Tinfang in 1882. But it also seems that Oxford University was interested in special Chinese students: Sir Reginald Johnston was sent to by the principal of Magdalen college Herbert Warren to China at the beginning of the 20th century, to recruit the young emperor to Oxford, where all the other future rulers of Asia were recruited. Although Oxford is claiming to have a century-long relationship with China, it seems that at the beginning of the 20th century the US was still the most favored place to study abroad.

4. Republican China and her foreign relations 1911-1949

4.1 The consolidation of Republican China

This working paper had as its topic actually only trends and possibilities for the European perceptions during the Qing times. After 1911, however, foreign relations, who were affecting only a few people during the late Qing would force their way into every part of Chinese society, so I will sketch out these developments briefly.

Between 1912 and 1949, China transformed herself from a weak vast Qing Empire and became a super power herself. William Kirby (1997) delineates three areas that were key to the transformation of the Qing Empire to a Republic and finally to the People’s republic of China. The first task was obviously to define the borders of the Chinese Em-

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64 Harnisch 1999: 88ff.
67 Reginald Johnston Fleming published his memoirs of his time in China as a tutor of emperor PuYi in 1934.
68 Bickers 1999:144.
pire. China, which up to 1911 was rather more a geographic description than a political entity, finally drew borders, and they were almost (except in the case of Outer Mongolia) congruent with the Qing Empire. Through shrewd negotiations and supported by the Western powers, China managed to integrate Tibet, Xinjiang and Manchuria into the realms of the Republic of China. As China delineated the borders of a new nation state, everybody within these realms belonged now to China.69

The second largest task for the Republic of China was to get rid of any foreign powers who still held extraterritorial rights or were in a “colonial situation”. Kirby states that the nationalist regime had an “extraterritoriality complex”. This complex came into existence after the Washington naval conference of 1922 (which was from the Chinese perspective a disaster), and was accompanied by a wave of popular anti-foreignism, orchestrated and encouraged by the Chinese government. Nevertheless, the European powers played along: After China had established its rule over the Qing Empire, it managed also to take control over all areas that had been in the hands of the foreigners: by 1930, China managed to get control over maritime customs, tariffs, postal communications, the treaty ports and most of the foreign concessions in China.70

Julia Strauss has shown that, for this task, the Chinese recruited the most cosmopolitan and well educated group of young men in all over China, who were also able to tame the wilder parts of the treaty ports.71

In the realms of diplomacy, the catastrophic first World War of 1914-1918 left Europe in pieces and made China a player in a reorganized, multipolar, international system that was incorporated into all major World organizations and also a partner in the League of Nations. Since the League of Nations was, particularly during the Manchurian crisis, not in a position to enforce its principles, China took to pursue its interests through an independent diplomacy.

4.2 Chinese perceptions of Europe and the West

On the political level, the crisis with Japan in the 1930s forced China to search for allies, and she found them in Germany, the United States and Russia. The Nanjing government entered into modern China’s first cooperative relationship based upon both the principle and practice of equality and mutual benefit.72

The cultural and economic connections with Europe reached their peak during the times of Republican China. For the first time in Chinese history, Chinese had relatives and friends living in Europe or the United States and returning home to tell the tales. Shanghai and the treaty ports remained a meeting point and a “contact zone” for European missionaries, military staff and advisors, as well as doctors and mercenaries. Also, members of the Chinese elite were able to form for the first time a perception of Eu-
Europe, or mainly the United States, without having to leave Shanghai. Many universities, high schools and rather prestigious institutions of higher learning opened their doors in Shanghai, in what is considered the beginning of modern academic disciplines and the training of Chinese students in China on a high international standard. Also, many influential Europeans and Americans travelled to China to learn about the success of this country, among them authors (Bertrand Russell, George Bernard Shaw), political activists (Agnes Smedley, Edward Snow) or other famous personalities (Albert Einstein, Charles Spencer Chaplin). Of course, there were still many Chinese students in Europe during this time, and their careers – particularly after 1949 – are not only very interesting but also an understudied field. It has not yet been asked how his years in Europe influenced Deng Xiaoping’s European perceptions (it is known, however, that he did speak very little French, but acquired a life-long taste for drinking coffee and wine, and eating bread and cheese). From the perspective of Shanghai, it would be difficult to single out a clear European perception in cultural realms: US American and European influences intermingled and turned into a “West” that only after 1949 was disentangled again in the United States and Europe.

5. Conclusion and Prospects

Does history influence the way Chinese elites perceive the EU today? Do history and culture even shape China-EU policy?

Three reasons were named to object to a positive answer of this question: Firstly, the age of the EU itself, which did not exist when the Qing-dynasty drew to a close.

Secondly, the question regarding whether daily foreign policy is indeed based on historical and cultural values or rather a matter of rational choice. Thirdly, it is always difficult to determine which history would be chosen: reference to history is highly selective and, at times, subjected to fashion.

Nevertheless, there are some arguments that favor the undertaking of looking into questions of history and culture. Firstly, although China herself claims to have turned a new page in 1949 she has always had strong ties and relations with the world, and the influence of state ideology on foreign policy during the times of Mao is often overstated, so it can be assumed, that history indeed still plays a role.

The Qing government only thought of Europe as “Europe” during its early years in the 18th century. In the 19th century, Europe was seen as a conglomeration of nation states with differing interests. It seems, that the addition of the United States created a “West”, that is different from Europe. But how can we evaluate and measure the influence of history and culture on China-EU relations today? John K. Fairbank for example delineated three major diplomatic traditions and inquired which of these traditions are still valid in the period after Mao. In this working paper it was, however, suggested that agents were usually involved in coining and determining an image of Europe. A survey of the existing literature shows, that, although the question of how Europeans view China is

73 Ting Ni 2002:36ff.
74 Vogel 2011:19 ff.
rather well researched, the theme of the Chinese agents whose perceptions informed China’s elite is rather under-researched. Questions that should thus be asked are: How did Chinese elites perceive themselves in relation to Europe, and were there contact zones? During the early Qing times, Chinese knowledge and perception of Europe was only collected in China. The Chinese elites were in contact with the European Jesuit missionaries at the court of Beijing, and their technology and knowledge were integrated to enhance the military power of the Qing Empire. The transfer, however, went both ways: European monarchs read with great fascination the reports sent back to Europe by the Jesuit missionaries. But only during the 19th century did the elites have more chances to form their own image of Europe. Not only came several more contact zones and other places in China into existence, where Chinese and Europeans from all strata of society were able to interact, but also more and more Chinese (diplomats, university students) travelled abroad. Although many of them went on to become famous university directors or academics and even politicians, their European experience was to be rather much downplayed during the Mao years and is thus under-researched.

In the end, if we look closely, there are certainly trends in Chinese foreign policy that can be traced back to history, for example the always evoked “traditionally good relations to Germany”. But it can be assumed that actual observations about Europe, facts and experiences written down and reported back to China, usually do not correspond with these Chinese perceptions of Europe that shape foreign policy. Decisions with reference to history are usually very selective and have their bases in the “rational choice” policy that makes up daily politics. This would probably be the reason why the scholarship on Chinese perception of Europe in history of culture is so minimal (apart from the fact that this field is very difficult to tackle). For further research, it would probably be more rewarding to turn into the direction that Fairbank already suggested more than 40 years ago, and look at the strategies. On the other hand, personal encounters have always shaped the way foreign policy has been carried out. A good middle path between these two extremes might be a good solution to an approach to this particularly interesting field in international history.

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