Addressing non-traditional security threats under climate change conditions: towards a new research agenda on norm diffusion in EU-Asia security relations

May-Britt U. Stumbaum
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Abstract

While scholarly work and policy speeches have mostly dealt with the EU’s capabilities and performance in traditional security issues like wars and war-like intrastate conflicts, the EU’s source of influence in Asia-Pacific seems rather to lie within its vast amount of expertise and technology concerning those threats that are most imminent in the Asia Pacific region: non-traditional security threats such as water, food, energy (in-)securities and potential conflicts arising over access to scarce, transboundary resources and impacts of growth policies – intensified by the consequences of climate change. Drawing on previous research on diffusion mechanisms in EU security policies towards the Asia-Pacific region, this paper will make the case for enlarging norm diffusion research in EU-Asia relations to non-traditional security threats (NTS) and will demonstrate its theoretical as well as social relevance.

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Keywords

Traditional Security, Non-Traditional Security, EU, Asia-Pacific, Norm Diffusion
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1. **Introduction**

This paper aims to make the case for analysing the diffusion of norms and paradigms in the field of non-traditional security challenges between Asia and Europe. It explains the social and theoretical relevance – answering the question of why we should do this – as well as the theoretical approach to research - how should we do this? The majority of scholarly work and policy speeches has primarily dealt with the EU's performance in traditional security issues like wars and war-like intrastate conflicts: Yet, the EU's source of influence in Asia-Pacific lies within its vast amount of expertise and technology concerning those threats that haunt the Asia-Pacific region most: non-traditional security challenges (NTS) such as insecurity in the supply of water, food and energy (aggravated by the water-energy-food security (WEF) nexus) and potential conflicts arising over access to scarce, transboundary resources and impacts of growth policies. These non-traditional security threats are further intensified by the impact of on-going climate change and resonate with Europe's global security concerns as listed in its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS emphasised non-traditional security challenges and the link between security and climate change by stating that “climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’”. Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible” (The European Council 2009: 14f.). The High Representative’s report to the European Council on “Climate Change and International Security” of March 2008 (Representative 2008; The European Council 2003, 2008) further elaborated the link and the increasing salience of addressing non-traditional security challenges.

Concerning Asia-Pacific, the European Union’s interests are regional as well as global: Regionally, with the Asia-Pacific region not only the global economic powerhouse these days, but also the main trading area for the EU, the EU has a strong interest in stability in the region and in keeping its maritime routes – as 90% of EU trade is seaborne – open and free from sources of conflict, ranging from territorial disputes to piracy. Globally, the EU has an interest in cooperating in addressing global challenges that have been

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I would like to thank Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, as well as the NFG Researchers (Olivia Gippner, Garima Mohan, Jizhou Zhao) and the NFG Associate Fellows from whose expertise we have benefitted as well, particularly for this paper: Marc Lanteigne, Philomena Murray, Natalia Chaban, Robert Brears and Zhao Chen.

Particular thanks also goes to Anja Jetschke for the opportunity to present my ideas at GIGA and to Karen Hussey, Jacqueline Lo, Katherine Daniell, Michael Eburn at ANU for the fruitful discussions.

2 The WEF nexus underlines the interlinkages between water, energy and food security, i.e. that the increase in food production, addressing food security, will require more energy and more water, impacting water and energy security and so on; for further information, please see, among others: http://www.water-energy-food.org
further magnified by climate change, such as scarcity-induced conflicts, mass migration and other consequences of scarcity (e.g. water-energy-food nexus). However, the further away the target countries of EU foreign policy are, the more the EU has to rely on instruments of persuasion and communication, as it neither has the power for legal coercion (as in dealing with Applicant States) or military coercion, nor the economic incentive of market access as in trade policies.

Extrapolating from previous research on diffusion mechanisms in EU security policy towards the Asian Pacific region in fields of traditional security policy, this paper first outlines the theoretical framework for norm diffusion as part of the EU’s foreign and security policy towards distant third countries such as states in the Asia-Pacific region; it will then outline the EU’s interest in Asia-Pacific as well as the change in security concepts in both regions, Europe and Asia (and the United States, for that matter), towards assigning a higher prominence to non-traditional security threats (NTS). Drawing on this background, the paper will argue why research on norm diffusion in addressing non-traditional security challenges is a relevant new research agenda by outlining the potential that the EU can offer in terms of expertise, experience and technology as instruments to pursue its broader foreign policy goals of maintaining stability and influence in the region. Connecting the expected added value for academic research as well as for policy analysis, the paper will conclude with a summary of the social and theoretical relevance of such an undertaking and provide an outlook for further research in its conclusion.

2. Part I: Analysing Norm Diffusion as Part of the EU’s Foreign Policy towards Distant Third Countries

The EU’s policy approach of persuasion and norm promotion coincides with the identity debate in academia about the European Union, particularly on the contested concept of “civilian power” (Börzel/Risse 2009; Duchêne 1972; Maul 2009). Today, this debate has abated and is further overshadowed by the perceived decline in the EU’s influence in global affairs, as exemplified by the EURO crisis. In principle, however, the European Union’s tendency to opt for non-military means first and to succeed by convincing, socialising and negotiating – by transferring its norms and values – has remained dominant. Instead of analysing the debate on the agency of the European Union as a civilian or normative power in the traditional framework, the European Union’s success in promoting norms can rather be traced within the norm diffusion approach.

According to Youngs, the EU’s policies of spreading its paradigm and promoting democratisation are implemented by institutionalised processes of negotiation and persuasion (e.g. via political dialogues and cooperation) (Youngs 2001). Continuous social interaction between policymakers of different states (in the constructivist paradigm) can endogenously influence norms and identities of the participating actors (Wendt 1994: 384). Ian Johnston applied this social constructivist approach to Chinese behaviour in international organisations.
and identified three processes of socialisation within the causal mechanisms of social learning: mimicking, persuasion and social influence (Johnston 2008).

With a focus on the European Union’s policies, these constructivist approaches of socialisation have manifested themselves in Europeanisation studies and their analyses of bilateral rule-transfer from the European Union to Member States, Accession States and non-European states beyond the perspective of membership; in short, studies have focused on “conditions under which one single non-EU country selects, adopts and eventually implements part of the European legal system” (Rousselin 2012: 5).

Linking Europeanisation literature on bilateral rule transfer to International Relations literature, Rousselin identifies a “conceptual consensus around three main explanatory mechanisms which can account for bilateral rule transfer” (Rousselin 2012: 6ff):

a) Drawing on realist / rationalist assumptions, the first mechanism stresses the mobilization of power asymmetries as in the external incentives model (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005: 10-17), the coercion model (Knill/Lenschow 2005: 585-587) or hierarchical governance model, and power-based explanations (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 797, 803-804). Differences in power resources are derived from the EU’s market size (Drezner 2005) and ability to link rule transfer with market access via the principle of conditionality (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004).

b) Resorting to constructivist templates, the second mechanism underpins the EU’s preference for exporting policy solutions internationally that mirror its own internal institutional arrangements, through programmes and networks that provide opportunities for socialisation and persuasion to take place and subsequently alter domestic beliefs and expectations (Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002: 259; Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009). Comparable models such as social learning and communication-based Europeanisation models draw on the logic of appropriateness (Bauer et al. 2007; Knill/Lenschow 2005; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005).

c) The third mechanism stresses the pull-factor from domestic societal forces that leads governments to favour the adoption of EU rules. This mechanism includes lesson-drawing (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005: 20-25) and other rational models based on the logic of competition (Bauer et al. 2007; Knill/Lenschow 2005) and are spurred by similarities of constitutional and administrative structures between the EU and the rule-importing country (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 804-805).

As the literature illustrates, EU ideas, policies, and institutions have travelled well across the borders of Europe. Yet, the greater the distance between the “recipient” country and the EU, the less appropriate it has been to refer to the spread of EU policies and institutions as Europeanisation (Börzel/Risse 2012b). These aforementioned approaches

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* Börzel identifies three main streams in the Europeanisation literature (Börzel 2010, cf. from Rousselin 2012: 5): A.) The original Europeanisation-West research agenda, focusing on the impact of EU membership on individual EU Member States, B.) the Europeanisation-East agenda that traced the transformative effect of membership prospects on Accession / Candidate Countries (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) and C.) the Europeanisation-South or “Europeanization beyond Europe” Agenda (Schimmelfennig 2007) that extrapolated the research framework to countries deprived of membership prospects such as countries within the European Neighbourhood Policy context (Lavenex/Uçarer 2004; Lavenex et al. 2009).
seem to be particularly inadequate for EU policies designed to further its security goals: Rather than exporting a clear set of rules that the EU can underpin, through incentives such as membership or conditionality in terms of market access, the EU has striven to spread norms such as “effective multilateralism”, has promoted international regimes, and is increasingly focusing on cooperating in these efforts with (and thereby influencing) emerging powers in Asia-Pacific. Faced with limited military capabilities, a lack of global authority as an enforcer such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for trade, and a division of competencies between the intergovernmental and supranational level, the EU has involved its Strategic Partners and other countries in the region as well as ASEAN in programmes and dialogues that aim at support, persuasion and socialisation. Previous research in ‘hard security’ cases has identified security policy changes within the EU’s Strategic Partner countries India and China that are in line with European paradigms – such as India’s and China’s increasing involvement in international export control regimes despite their long-standing traditions of non-alignment and also the alteration of their understanding of security towards rather “comprehensive security concepts” that resemble European ideas. Given the distance to the recipient country as well as the limited and fragmented power of the EU in this field, the mechanisms underpinning this potential spread of EU paradigms and norms cannot be analysed in the framework of traditional rule-transfer analysis frameworks as provided by Europeanisation or the aforementioned IR mechanisms. In the absence of a global enforcer, the peculiarity of the defence market and political instruments such as existing arms embargoes as well as continued political sensitivities, the possibility of invoking power asymmetries by, for example, using the instrument of conditionality for market access is rather limited in the security policy realm. Given the characteristics of the policy field – security policy – current research on policy diffusion provides an adequate framework for analysis. Research on the external diffusion of European norms has focused on the social mechanism of socialisation (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2007; March/Olsen 1989, 1998; Sikkink/Finnemore 1998), persuasion (Checkel 2001; Finnemore 1996; Haas 1992; Keck/Sikkink 1998) and emulation (Börzel/Risse 2012b; Jakobi/Martens 2007; Rose 1993; Tews 2002).

Diffusion studies focus on the “what is changing and/or diffusing” (Rayner/Howlett 2008: 386) as the Dependent Variable and aim to identify the underlying mechanisms of the whole causal process. Diffusion is hereby broadly understood as processes through which ideas, policies, and institutions spread transnationally, i.e., across borders and regions, time and space (Börzel/Risse 2012b; Gilardi 2012; Hays/Franzese 2008; Plümper/Schneider 2009; Simmons et al. 2006; Strang/Meyer 1993).

The generally termed “third generation”5 of diffusion studies today deals explicitly with the causal mechanisms that underpin diffusion processes and their comparative analysis (Garand/Daley 2005; Heinze 2011; Rayner/Howlett 2008: 386; Shipan et al. 2008; Witmer/Boehmke 2004). Diffusion scholars have thereby developed a set of causal mechanisms through which ideas, policies and institutions spread transnationally, i.e., across borders and regions (Jetschke 2010; Meseguer 2005; Rogers 1983; Simmons/Elkins 2005): Rationalist-based mechanisms refer to the effect of interaction (two-way street) and lesson drawing, e.g. that states adopt similar policies

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5 The first generation of diffusion research focused on conceptualisation (Walker 1969, Wilensky 1975, DeLeon 1979), and the second generation empirically tested various hypothetical diffusion mechanisms, identifying basic diffusion mechanisms such as policy emulation, harmonization, lesson drawing and others (Rose 1991, 1993; Bennet 1991; Wolman 1992; Stone 1994; Dobbin et al. 2007).
about the same time because they learn from each other (and from the other policy’s success); to the likeliness of failure in learning, as actors are only limited rationally and use several cognitive heuristics to process information (Kahnemann/Tversky 1982). More constructivist minded approaches take into account social networks, epistemic communities and international organisations that constitute channels for the transmittal of ideas and knowledge, and also their ability to artificially create demands for policies or act as teachers of norms, militating against rational learning (Finnemore/Barnett 2005). Actors can hence adopt policies/institutions because they want to become more like their role models, including actors mimicking others because this confers legitimacy (Rowan/Meyer 1977; Strang/Meyer 1993); in this case, actors might be less concerned about the efficiency of the adopted policy, but celebrate the symbolic value of belonging to a community (Jetschke 2010).

2.1 Casual Mechanisms in Diffusion Processes

Processes of diffusion such as learning, competition, coercion and socialisation are underpinned by causal mechanisms (Shipan et al. 2008) and take place across space and time. Diffusion studies in large part focus on understanding the process of empirical phenomena (Simmons/Elkins 2005), and mostly employ cross-national measures to empirically test specific diffusion mechanisms (Jetschke 2010; Knill/Lenschow 2005; Meseguer 2005). With an exclusive focus on voluntary processes of diffusion, Heinze differentiates between four classes of causal mechanisms depending on the rationality for policy adoption and the impact of policy choice: emulation, learning, socialisation and externalities. While learning and socialisation trigger behavioural change by altering the actors’ beliefs and preferences, emulation and externalities are based on structural explanations (Heinze 2011: 6ff).

Börzel and Risse distinguish between two types of diffusion mechanisms, direct and indirect mechanisms, taking the two-way dynamic of diffusion processes into account in the analytical framework (Börzel/Risse 2012b): Where direct mechanisms describe diffusion processes initiated and pushed aside that are conceptualised by the sender in the analysed relationship, indirect mechanisms refer to processes of diffusion that are initiated by the intended recipient of the relationship. For the sake of clarity in describing the diffusion process, the following will refer to the “sender” and intended “recipient” of diffusion processes, keeping in mind that diffusion is a two-sided process in which norms are also spread from the recipients’ side to the senders in the interaction process (the “return ticket”).

Direct and indirect mechanisms are further subcategorised: Direct mechanisms can be grouped into four possible forms of mechanisms through which the proposed “sender” of norms strives to encourage the other side, the “recipient”, to adopt or adhere to its set of norms through: a) physical force or legal enforcement (coercion - only applicable where the EU possesses legal coercive powers, i.e. within its internal policies), b) incentives through positive and negative conditionality and capacity-building (instrumental rationality), c) socialization by providing an authoritative model (normative rationality) and d) persuasion by promoting ideas as legitimate or true through reason-giving (communicative rationality).
Indirect mechanisms, on the other hand, are divided into three types of mechanisms through which the defined “recipient” of norms aims to emulate others in order to further its goals: competition, lesson-drawing and mimicry. The first two types are based on instrumental rationality and present mechanisms of functional emulation, implying that actors act rationally in order to maximise utility according to a pre-defined set of interests: Competition refers to the individual adjustment by an actor of its behaviour towards best practices. Lesson-drawing refers to this actor’s active search to identify policies and rules that other actors have effectively applied somewhere else in order to solve a similar challenge and that appear to be transferable to the actor’s domestic context. Mimicry, however, depicts an actor that is motivated by the logic of appropriateness (normative emulation): The actor may strive to be or become a member of good standing in the international community and thus seeks to emulate norms, policies, or institutions of another respected actor in order to “do the right thing”. It thereby might imply a partial automatic “downloading” of institutional “software” in order to adopt the code of conduct of the desired community (Börzel/Risse 2012b: 2-3; Torney 2012: 7ff).

![Diffusion Process Model - mechanisms, scope conditions and filter factors](Graph: Stumbaum, 2014)

Research work on the diffusion of norms from the European Union to distant third parties in traditional security fields has shown that despite the often spiteful rhetoric of the EU having no role in security policy, European norms are in fact being partly taken on, sought after Part II: The EU’s security interest in Asia-Pacific (Stumbaum 2012; Stumbaum et al.) or used as a source of inspiration, exemplified by former ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan’s reference to the European integration model (Stumbaum et al. 2012). However, the following section will illustrate the EU’s security interest in Asia-Pacific and show that the EU’s source of influence in Asia-Pacific security rather lies within its vast amount of expertise and technology concerning non-traditional security threats. Accordingly, it is essential to broaden diffusion research to this field.
3. Part II: The EU’s Security Interest in Asia-Pacific

From a European point of view, key security interests in Asia-Pacific include maintaining regional stability and keeping the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) open, with ninety percent of European trade being seaborne. The volatile security situation in Asia with the ongoing redefinition of relationships and power balances in the region and unresolved territorial claims in primarily maritime areas are a direct threat to the EU’s interest in a region that has become Europe’s prime destination for trade (Reiterer 2014). Starting with a brief outline of traditional security challenges in the region, this section will particularly focus on the area of non-traditional security challenges.

3.1 Traditional Security Challenges in Asia-Pacific

Asia-Pacific assembles four nuclear powers at the closest proximity possible – the officially acknowledged nuclear power PRC and the (indirectly acknowledged by the US-India nuclear deal) nuclear power India, as well as Pakistan and North Korea. Among these four countries, China is the only one that, as one of the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), possesses veto power in UNSC resolutions – often coordinated with the Eurasian nuclear power and UNSC Permanent Member, Russia. Repeated clashes between Chinese and Japanese coast guards in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as well as clashes over other disputed islands and fishery grounds between China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and even Taiwan, have significantly increased since the incident between the Chinese navy and the USS Impeccable in 2009. They have brought the disputed territorial claims back into the spotlight, also shedding light on the still unresolved leftovers from pre-Cold War times. In addition to the conflicting claims of island chains in the East and South China Seas, border disputes are still on the agenda, underlined by the recent quarrel between Chinese and Indian troops along the Nathu La border line (Harris/Wong 2013). What all these disputes have in common is that they illustrate a phase of testing expansion and limits of capabilities and spheres of influence of the emerging powers, underpinned by bold economic growth, flourishing nationalism and rapidly increasing arms expenditures that, in 2012, even outbalanced the decline in Western countries’ spending in global military expenditures. In 2012, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 22 percent of global military expenditure, with China’s “revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics” being accompanied, for example, by major naval investments by countries like Vietnam and Indonesia (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2013).

But Asia-Pacific also figures highly in European interests in the field of non-traditional security threats – new challenges, such as climate-induced mass migration, for example, might not only destabilise the region with its economic consequences for the Asian economic powerhouse, but could also lead to sizable immigration into Europe. Furthermore, for addressing the non-traditional security threats as mentioned in the European Security Strategy – ranging from terrorism and organised crime to pandemics and natural disasters – Asian-Pacific states are core partners as well as core destinations for some of the measures.
Non-traditional security challenges, finally, present an opportunity to contribute to peace and stability in the region without having sizable hard power capabilities at hand and thereby secure influence in the region while ensuring continued cooperation with the United States (and with China, the EU’s second largest trading partner) on global affairs in tune with the US’ rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific.

3.2 Non-Traditional Security Challenges in Asia-Pacific

Non-Traditional Security Threats are defined as those which “transcend national boundaries, go beyond the military sphere, are unpredictable and/or unexpected, have both internal and external elements and ramifications, and are frequently interwoven with traditional security threats” (Craig 2007: vii). Climate change acts as a threat multiplier, magnifying the impact of challenges such as heavy storms and floods. Particularly water plays a key role in the new, non-traditional challenges the Asia-Pacific region is facing: More than 83 percent of water-related disasters occurred in Asia-Pacific in the years 2000-2006, with floods, droughts and windstorms being the most frequently occurring disasters within the past 100 years (88.5 percent of the total number of disasters). Three out of four Asia-Pacific Nations are faced with water insecurity, according to a recent study jointly prepared by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Water Forum (APFW) (ADB 2013). Sixty of Asia’s river basins are transboundary (Europe: 68; Africa: 64) (UNWater 2013). With regard to the water-energy-food (WEF) security nexus that expresses the interlinkage between water, food and energy security, water scarcity can lead to various spill-off challenges ranging from health issues to mass migration to political instability, as well as to transboundary conflicts.

Water scarcity leads to massive reductions in the production of rice, wheat, maize and fish. Both of the most populated countries, India and China, will face a fierce reduction in the yield of wheat and rice, anywhere between 30-50% by 2050. Concurrently, demand for food grains will go up by at least 20%, forcing China and India to import more than 200-300 million tons of wheat and rice, globally driving up prices of these commodities in the world market with adverse consequences on the poor all over the world (Strategic foresight 2010). A case in point are the Himalayan River Basins spanning China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh, home to about 1.3 billion people – almost half of their total population and nearly 20 percent of the world’s population. Due to depletion, pollution and inefficient management, this region is facing severe water scarcity within the next 15 years, leading to a decline in food availability, worsening livelihood opportunities in rural areas, desertification and soil erosion, and a rise in sea-level, followed by construction of dams and consequently the displacement and migration of 50 to 70 million people in the four countries concerned by 2050. One probable result is social conflict on a communal or secular basis and a deterioration of relations between the affected countries. Although this will probably not automatically trigger a war between the affected countries, as countries are well aware of the detrimental effect of armed conflict on their economic development plus the unfinished modernisation of the countries’ armed forces, it can

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6 For more information and recent initiatives on the WEF nexus, see http://www.water-energy-food.org/en/practice.html
trigger new external alliances, producing fresh alignments and even more polarisation and uncertainty in Asia and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ politics, which can compromise the internal options of each country (Group 2010).

With bold economic growth and racing industrialisation, environmental degradation continues to worsen throughout the emerging and developing economies, with transboundary consequences for all Asia-Pacific countries (and hence potential for conflict): As a victim of climate change as well as the consequences of its rapid industrialisation, China, for example, faces severe deforestation and desertification: North of Beijing, the Gobi Desert currently expands by about 2,500 km² annually, leading to eventual sand storms in the capital. Concurrently, air quality has become an ever more pressing and transboundary challenge in Asia. According to the World Bank, 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are in the People’s Republic of China (World Bank, cit. from (CBSNews 2010)), with measurements of Beijing air quality showing highly hazardous 755 micrograms per cubic metre in January 2013 on the Air Quality Index (AQI) HAN, J. (2006). Transgressing clouds of smog from China to neighbouring countries like Japan (Ryall 2013), or the haze attributed mostly to fires burning on the Indonesian island of Sumatra engulfing parts of Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and Singapore have led to much tension and triggered multilateral initiatives such as the setting up of the ASEAN Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee on Transboundary Haze Pollution (MSC) in June 2006 or the first cooperation on air pollution data between China, Japan and South Korea in May 2013⁸ (Gooch 2013; Times 2013).

Non-Traditional Security challenges (NTS) have been further aggravated by the unintended consequences of rapid industrialisation and economic growth. Following the notion of comprehensive security that combines military with economic and political security in a mutually influencing triangle, issues like the widening economic inequality and the worsening of living conditions by the aforementioned degradation of the environment can have a destabilising political impact with potential military consequences. Nearly 50 percent of the people living in Asia-Pacific are poor, with one-fifth being extremely poor. Millions were lifted out of poverty as, for example, eastern and south-eastern Asia achieved the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of halving extreme poverty, while poverty has declined all over Asia-Pacific by 15 percent within the last decade. Yet, the Gini coefficient⁹ is high, hinting at rising income inequalities, with the highest values measured for Indonesia, India and Hong Kong (China), according to the OECD. In India, the Gini is as high as 54, which is 50 percent higher than the OECD average (OECD 2012). Social security programmes and public healthcare still remain insufficient in many places, despite an ageing population not only in developed countries like Japan, but also emerging economies like China, intensified by its one-child policy.

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⁷This index, based on revised standards of the American Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), deems an AQI of 100 as “unhealthy for sensitive groups” and anything above 400 as “hazardous” for all.
⁸http://haze.asean.org/info/indo-sing
⁹This Gini coefficient measures the inequality among income values. A Gini coefficient of zero symbolises perfect equality, where for example, everyone has an exactly equal income. A Gini coefficient of one or 100 on the percentile scale hints at maximal inequality among income levels, for example, where only one person has all the income.
3.3 European and United States’ Assessment of Climate Change in Non-Traditional Security Challenges

The United States’ reinvigorated interest in Asia-Pacific has triggered a grand debate about the transatlantic partnership in terms of continuing the transatlantic partnership in Asia through coordinating and complementing policies and initiatives in the region, as well as in terms of potential conflicting interests within the – as labelled by the ESS - most important partnership of the EU (ESS, 2003). While there has been a growing consensus on the salience of non-traditional security challenges for a while, there is an ever-increasing awareness of the threat-multiplying impact climate change has on these risks.

Non-traditional security challenges affect European countries and the United States alike, either directly or through their interests in Asia-Pacific, and are magnified by the impact of the on-going climate change that brings the interwovenness of challenges to the forefront. US Secretary of State John Kerry stated in Stockholm on May, 14th, 2013 regarding the impact of climate change: “So it’s not just an environmental issue and it’s not just an economic issue. It is a security issue, a fundamental security issue that affects life as we know it on the planet itself, and it demands urgent attention from all of us” (Kerry 2013). The 2014 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), released in March 2014 by the Pentagon, emphasises the impact of climate change as a “threat multiplier that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions” and states that “the pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world” (Defense 2014: 8).

Also on the European side, there is increasing awareness of the nexus between climate change and security: Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti, who joined the British government as United Kingdom’s Climate and Energy Security Envoy after serving 37 years in the British navy, warned that climate change poses “one of the greatest risks we face in the 21st century [as] by virtue of our interdependencies around the world, it will affect all of us” and continued to argue that climate change was a powerful threat multiplier at choke points in the global trade network, such as the Straits of Hormuz, a central gateway for the shipping of the world’s traded oil and gas (Carrington 2013).


The growing presence of and demand for action due to non-traditional security threats has had a transformative impact on how security is understood in Europe as well as in Asia-Pacific today. Challenges requiring immediate action in past years such as terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and in Bali (2002, 2005), and the presences of terrorist groups appearing to become globally connected as well as spreading epidemics such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) or the Avian Flu and the sudden waves of refugees and disruption of trade, e.g. for the EU due to unrests along its borders, led to a reconceptualization of security in Europe and Asia alike (Biscop 2005;
Buzan 1997; Maier-Knapp 2010; Pennisi di Floristella 2013).

4.1 Changing Security Notions towards Non-Traditional Security Threats and a Comprehensive Approach in Europe

The on-going transformation of the security concept towards a comprehensive approach with an emphasis on non-traditional threats within European debates is reflected in the 2008 Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, which outlines the efforts of the EU “to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity”. It points out the “unique set of instruments” on which the EU can draw (The European Council 2008: 2).

European security conceptualisation today reflects the EU’s situation as a “security community” in the Karl Deutschian sense, that faces increasingly non-traditional threats and to a much lesser extent – if at all – traditional challenges. With no major military threat demanding attention, challenges such as organised crime, illegal immigration, social and economic underdevelopment, lack of democratic institutions and respect for human rights as well as ecological problems come to the forefront (Biscop 2004; Biscop/Rik 2003; Stumbaum 2007). Responding to this changed security environment, the European Union and Member States such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom – with security policy still remaining an intergovernmental, nationally rooted policy field – have transformed their conceptualisation of security as well as the approach for dealing with challenges into a ‘comprehensive security’ norm. In comprehending the threat, this concept illustrates the changing nature of risks and threats in the twenty-first century, underlining the pre-eminence of international terrorism, the influence of non-governmental actors and the asymmetrical nature of new confrontations. Going beyond the traditional state-centric approaches, the European Security Strategy acknowledges the increasing nexus between external and internal security, as well as its multidimensional, comprehensive and inclusive character (Duke/Ojanen 2006).

Accordingly, the ESS includes challenges that go far beyond purely military concerns, including demographic shifts, pandemics and the securing of natural resources. They agree that the challenges of today are global in nature and require concerted responses by the international community, and necessitate extensive international cooperation. The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 names five key challenges: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It adds as ‘global challenges’ poverty, pandemics, environmental degradation and catastrophes, and securing resources (European Council 2003).

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The term was actually used for the first time by Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in the 1970s; see Feddema, Igarashi and Radtke, Comprehensive Security in Asia. Germany has been focusing on an ‘extended security concept’ (erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff), while also the United Kingdom and France use comparable concepts.
4.2 Changing Security Notions towards Non-Traditional Security Threats in Asia-Pacific

The change towards a higher prominence of non-traditional security threats in Asian-Pacific security notions was demonstrated at the 2012 Shangri-la Dialogue (and at the following 27th Asia-Pacific Roundtable) where almost every Asian defence minister started with the opening keynote speech of Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (Dung 2012), who referred to non-traditional threats as the most pressing issue in the region while also an opportunity to build up trust and confidence among neighbouring Asian states. Yet, the increasing prominence of NTS in Asian countries must be acknowledged as complementing traditional security, rather than substituting it. In comparison to more Western-dominated discourses addressing today’s challenges, however, where the term ‘human security’ has acquired more centrality, countries in the region are more receptive to the concept of non-traditional security due the absence of a potential infringement on national sovereignty that the ‘human security’ notion entails (RSIS 2012). In 2006, Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya claimed that the academic debate on Non-Traditional Security threats and the inherent debate on securitisation tended to be too Eurocentric and lacked a policy focus, yet there was a great scope for non-traditional threats entering the security notion in Asia-Pacific, ranging from challenges such as drugs and weapons trafficking in Indonesia, pandemics and diseases including HIV/AIDS, Avian Flu and SARS, poverty issues, transboundary resources such as in the Mekong River Basin, construction of migrating labour as a threat, and piracy in Southeast Asia (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006). The policy world followed suit, and, like the EU, ASEAN embarked on a wide array of initiatives in the non-traditional security field, giving greater prominence to cooperative and comprehensive security approaches (albeit the ASEAN way) and developed the concept of comprehensive security – already mentioned in the 1967 Declaration of Bangkok by recognising the “interdependence between economic growth, social progress, cultural development and the promotion of regional peace and stability” (Pennisi di Floristella 2013: 27) – further, from perceiving NTS issues primarily as being of domestic concerns, requiring national responses to challenges requiring transnational solutions and also offering possibilities to build confidence, trust and the establishment of the ASEAN Political Security Community (ASPC). The principle of comprehensive security that encompasses social, cultural, economic as well as political aspects is reflected in the ASEAN Vision 2020 as well as in the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 1997, 2007; Pennisi di Floristella 2013).

5. International Cooperation Needed to Address Non-Traditional Security Challenges

There is a growing consensus in Asia-Pacific as well as in European and American debates that non-traditional security challenges, given their transboundary and volatile

Footnotes:

11 For the speeches, please refer to http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-s-la-s-dialogue respectively http://www.isis.org.my
nature combined with a multitude of policy fields and a variety of actors and non-state actors involved, requires international cooperation in order to be addressed. Effective governance, human resilience and preparations are crucial at the national, regional and global level to effectively manage the pressing challenges, demanding commitment, and coordination and cooperation among stakeholders, from individuals to national governments and regional organisations (Group 2010; RSIS 2012). Particularly regional and international organisations play an important role as providers of platforms for dialogue and exchange of experiences and expertise – the diffusion of norms, best practices and paradigms – among countries. And this is where the EU’s interest in addressing non-traditional security challenges, its transformative foreign policy approach to norm diffusion spreading good governance, and the demand from the Asia-Pacific side for policies, practices and proven instruments come together.

5.1 How the EU Promotes its Security Policy Aims Worldwide

The European Union’s security agency has been shaped by its capabilities as well as its normative foundations as an institutional, inherently multilateral process to avoid further conflicts in Europe (Bretherton/Vogler 2002; Jupille/Caporaso 1998; Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006). At the core of EU foreign and security policy lays the paradigm of “effective multilateralism” and “a rule-based international order” (ESS, 2003:9).

“Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond. The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order” (ESS, 2003:10).

In accordance with the idea that the EU’s security interests are served best in a world with similar systems of governance, the European Union pursues its goals by striving to export normative regimes and “spreading good governance” through assistance programmes, conditionality, targeted trade measures and cooperation on the ground and within international forums. EU interests are pursued by measures of convincing, assistance, negotiation and socialisation and only as a last resort by military means.

With the EU not being a hegemony like the US (Telò 2001) nor possessing the US’ military or projection capabilities, “the further we move away from Europe, the fewer incentives the EU has on offer to promote its policies and institutions and the more it has to rely on mechanisms of persuasion and of communication to make its case” (Börzel/Risse 2012a: 8), particularly in the security policy field where market size plays only a subordinate role. Cooperation with its Strategic Partners in international peacekeeping missions and collaborating in international export control regimes or encouraging their membership illustrate the way the EU strives to operationalise its ambition to diffuse its norms, thereby addressing “key threats” as identified in the ESS, such as regional conflicts, failing states and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Council 2003: 3-4). The same
holds true for non-traditional threats, as mentioned in the ESS. Acknowledging that the EU’s foreign and security policy is a work in progress, the 2008 Report points out that “the EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world” (The European Council 2008: 2).

Towards Asia\textsuperscript{12}, the European Union has been promoting a policy of engagement, exchange, education and dialogue – creating forums of norm diffusion, since the 1994 Asia Strategy “Towards a new Asia strategy”. The subsequent 2001 Strategy “Europe and Asia” identified six objectives for EU-Asia relations, including enhanced engagement with the region to contribute to peace and security; strengthened mutual trade and investment flows; development cooperation and eradication of poverty; contribution to the protection of human rights, the spread of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; work towards global governance and environmental protection; and the raising of mutual awareness (Commission 1994, 2001). As outlined in the beginning, the EU’s Security Strategy further specifies the EU’s interest in the Asian region:

“In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens [...] Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.” (The European Council 2003b)

While interests, strategies and instruments were initially driven by what Michael Yahuda called the tyranny of distance and primacy of trade (Yahuda 1995, 2001), the growing importance of the region, catalysed by China’s accelerated ascendance to global power by the financial crises as well as the US rebalance led to increasing diplomatic, economic and, to a much lesser extent, military engagement with the region. The EU is hereby following the “3D security” (development, diplomacy, defence) approach, promoted by the US in addition to other states like the United Kingdom and Canada, , spelled out in its 2006 National Security Strategy (America 2006; O’Sullivan 2014). The US rebalance has spurred a renewed interest in intensifying the EU’s activities in the region beyond the trade realm and led in 2012 to the “The EU in Asia Year”, culminating in an increased presence of European representatives including the High Representative Baroness Ashton at EU-Asia and Asia-centred regional forums.

\textsuperscript{12}The following section draws on Stumbaum, “Impact of the Rebalance on Europe’s Interest in East Asia. Consequences for Europe in economic, diplomatic and military/security dimensions” in Hugo Meijer (ed.) Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance toward Asia: Diplomatic, Military and Economic Dimensions, Basingstoke: Palgrave/MacMillan (fc)
Strategies towards the Asia Pacific Region

Triggered by the transatlantic crash over the intended lifting of the EU arms embargo on China in 2004/5, Europeans started to think about their engagement in more strategic ways, developing for the first time EU guidelines on how to deal with China. Initially a secret document, they were published in a slightly changed fashion as the 2007 Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (The European Council 2007) and reflected the bottom-line of the EU’s attempt to operate in East Asia while taking US interests into account to avoid a new conflict. With the new strategic momentum provided by the Lisbon treaty coming into force, and catalysed by the increasing centrality that was placed onto East Asia with China’s ascendance and the US rebalance, the guidelines were fully revised and enlarged over a two-year process and published in 2012 as Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (Council 2012: 10ff) for the EU in the region and its overall approach, primarily in security matters. The Guidelines fall short, however, of prioritising strategic interests in the region.

Along with the comprehensive Guidelines, the EU also worked towards concluding security-related bilateral agreements with its Strategic Partners, such as the 2004 EU-China Joint Communiqué on Non-proliferation (Council 2004) or the EU-India Joint Action Plan of 2005 (revised in 2008), that explicitly mentions the joint promotion of peace and security in areas ranging from counter-terrorism to non-proliferation towards challenges catalysed by climate change and in the context of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (Council 2008).

Increased participation in regional security forums and improvements to bilateral relations

Following its paradigm of engagement and exchange, the European Union has been working on stepping up its involvement and presence at a high level in regional security forums as well as in bilateral relations. As a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) it has been hosting the meetings and aiming to become more active. However, in the fast-moving developments of forums becoming central and obsolete in the overlapping security forums in East Asia, the ARF has lost a lot of centrality by losing momentum, with a membership of 27 states as of early 2014. Particularly the meeting of defence ministers of the EAS Member States, referred to as ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) has evolved in recent years in the most vibrant forum on security issues in the region, conducting the first major Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief and Military Medicine exercise in the region in 2013, with about 3200 participants from all 18 ADMM+ states (Singapore 2013). The European Union as well as the United Kingdom and France as individual states have expressed their desire to join the EAS and hence the ADMM+; however, at the Singapore annual Asian security conference, the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore’s Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen underlined the EAS Member States’ preference for no further extension of the EAS in order to keep the momentum of its internal development (Hen 2013). In 2013, High Representative Catherine Ashton spoke for the first time at the Shangri-La Dialogue, along with the British and French Defence Ministers. Aiming to make the case for EU’s security interest in the region, as well as its potential contribution to the region, Ashton emphasised the EU’s “deep
commitment to promoting global security and prosperity, not as an Asian power, but an Asian partner” (Ashton 2013) and particularly underlined cooperation in coping with non-traditional threats in civil and military missions.

Besides its involvement in regional organisations, the EU has also worked on intensifying its bilateral relations and particularly its Strategic Partnerships in security affairs. In 2012, the EU and the People’s Republic of China agreed on a High Level Security and Defence Dialogue alongside a High Level Dialogue on Cyber Security. The EU Military Staff has worked towards more involvement in regional forums and bilateral exchanges, where the limits of the EU mandate allow – with foreign and security policy still being a prime area for national policy.

Parallel to the EU’s activities, individual EU Member States, spearheaded by the former Asian colonial powers United Kingdom and France, have stepped up their security-related engagements. Each of the “Big Three” have established Strategic Dialogues with Asian countries, particularly with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but also with Singapore, Korea, Japan and other countries in the region. Asian officers are selectively trained in European national Defence Academies and vice-versa. France and the United Kingdom have entertained on a limited scale joint naval search-and-rescue exercises and port calls with the PRC. Most significant, however, and rarely mentioned, might be the security implications of the European Member States as providers of military hardware to the region – Asia has the fastest-growing arms expenditures, with India being the world’s largest arms importer, China coming in second, Pakistan third, South Korea eighth, and Singapore ninth in 2013. Altogether, Asia and Oceania accounted for 47% of all global arms imports from 2009-2013, with Germany, France and the United Kingdom among the Top Three main suppliers to countries in the region (Wezeman/Wezeman 2014).

Despite the increased efforts, European and EU activities in “hard security” fields addressing traditional security challenges have so far exhibited only limited success, due to a lack of capabilities, for example in permanently deploying navy capabilities to the Far East, and lack of political will to assign adequate resources. The following section will therefore show where the European Union and Europeans can apply their assets to best be used in supporting the Asia-Pacific nations in addressing non-traditional security challenges – while the region’s traditional ones have been more or less successful managed, non-traditional security challenges, particularly under the impact of climate change, might become the most urgent to address.

5.2 How the EU Can Apply its Approach in Asia-Pacific in Non-Traditional Security Fields

Applying the EU’s strengths of its foreign and security policies based on providing examples, experience and expertise in trainings, common workshops and working groups, the EU has a lot to offer to address Asia-Pacific security needs and thereby addresses its own interests in the region and globally in terms of stabilisation and coping with climate change impacts.
Expertise, experience and technology in non-traditional security fields

Particularly in the field of new, non-traditional security challenges such as food, water and energy security, as well as maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the Europeans can assist with experiences, expertise and technology. This can be advanced through institution-to-institution exchanges (such as ASEAN-EU) within multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as well as between individual EU Member States and individual Asian and ASEAN Member States: Focusing on the water-food-energy nexus in the field of water security, for instance, Europe can provide legal and institutional models that resolve water disputes and promote the cooperative management of shared water resources in Asia-Pacific and exchange expertise on water resources management, as seen in the Indonesia-Netherlands Water Challenge (HWC Indonesia) or the German Water Partnership with, among others, Vietnam. The Lower Mekong Initiative provides opportunities for cooperation between the United States, affected ASEAN states and European countries. At the 9th ASEM Summit in Laos in 2012, Asian and European countries already agreed on the Danube-Mekong Cooperation Initiative. The Danube River Commission (ICPDR) is an example of how to manage a transboundary resource that crosses several countries. It started first with negotiations over navigation rights and today encompasses the full spectrum of water management. In the areas of maritime security and disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and conflict resolutions, European states have been active in exchanging views and expertise bilaterally with Asian countries such as China, Thailand and Myanmar, as well as engaging in EU initiatives.

Expertise and experiences in capacity building

ASEAN and regional integration plays a central role in diffusing bilateral escalation into multilateral debates, yet the capacities of the organisation and its forums have thus far remained limited and undeveloped. The European Union has been supporting the integration processes spearheaded by ASEAN by e.g. assisting ASEAN through the ASEAN-EU Programme for Regional Integration Support Phase II (APRIS II) and the ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU (ARISE). Individual EU Member States have also been active in supporting ASEAN, e.g. the German government’s support for the ASEAN Secretariat. The Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership, agreed upon in 2012, lays out a rich list of areas in which to foster cooperation, along with the European contribution to pressing needs in the region. The European Union as the only major actor without territorial claims nor military alliances in the region can offer capacities in terms of assisting in discussions for setting up cross-packages of traditional and non-traditional threat responses (e.g. in the area of maritime security, peacekeeping and disaster relief), while also adding multilateral legitimacy and institutional capacities to contribute to the sustainability and effectiveness of multilateral initiatives.

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13 For more information on the Holland Water Challenge, see http://www.hollandwaterchallenge.nl; More information on the German Water Partnership can be found at http://www.germanwaterpartnership.de/index.php?lang=en.
6. Issues of Caution and Why the Study of Norm Diffusion is Essential

However, European foreign policies are often met with criticism and hesitancy. Many of the European countries active in Asia-Pacific have a colonial history in the region, and also recent history has not been convincing to the Asian side that the Europeans were serious in a long-term and particularly substantial involvement in the region. The low-level participation and nominal achievements in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), established in 1996, is often mentioned as a point in case. Furthermore, the slow transformation from a donor-recipient perspective that is still dominant in EU-Asia relations due to the history of primarily development aid given by the EU, where development policy is one of the core fields besides trade where the European Commission has been able to act on a global level. This historic donor-recipient perspective is further aggravated by a large majority of ASEAN countries still, in fact developing countries (though rapidly catching up) and the bilateral focus of the EU on the relationship with its strategic partners China and Japan (Wong 2014: 8-9).

Accordingly, if “the further away the region is, the more the EU has to rely on persuasion etc.”, the more important it is to analyse the process of diffusion of norms, best practices and paradigms to understand the workings of the EU’s persuasion-based foreign policy towards distant countries. The following section will outline how the diffusion process in the EU’s foreign policy towards distant countries can be traced, analysed and assessed by using the current state of research on norm diffusion (third wave) and applying it to EU foreign and security policy towards Asia-Pacific.

6.1 Theoretical and Social Relevance of Analysing Norm Diffusion in European-Asian Relations in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Challenges

“The trick is to make social science speak to problems that we care about without sacrificing the rigor that qualifies it as science” (Gerring 2001: 257)

Referring to the above quote by Gerring, researchers Lehnert, Miller and Wonka outline the two dimensions of the concept of ‘relevance’, the theoretical and the social. Whereas the theoretical dimension refers to the research work’s contribution to an existing theoretical discourse and hence represents a social scientist’s ‘peer perspective’, the social relevance points to the non-peer audience gains from the presented work, for example for policy makers, but also for representatives from other disciplines in the process of collaborating on interdisciplinary research projects (Lehnert et al. 2007).

Analysing the diffusion of norms and best practices between Europe and Asia-Pacific in the realm of non-traditional security policy, with a focus on the process of diffusion, the mechanisms, filter factors and scope conditions at play address both dimensions of relevance: On the theoretical side, it adds to the growing research literature on diffusion processes, particularly with the Third Wave’s focus on mechanisms of diffusion processes and causalities within, while also contributing to the changing field of analysing European foreign and security policy that has been turning from a primarily identity-focused debate (“What kind of actor is the EU?”) to an increasingly output-
oriented capabilities debate (“What can the EU achieve and with what means?”). On the side of social relevance, analysing filter factors, scope conditions and the direct and indirect mechanisms of norm diffusion in the non-traditional security field will provide helpful information in order to ameliorate EU foreign and security policy in this field towards distant partners. Here, it has to rely on the effectiveness of communication and persuasiveness of its arguments, expertise and experience – and on the effectiveness of the “European” approach of pursuing its foreign and security policy worldwide.

7. Conclusion

Addressing the challenge of theoretical as well as social relevance, this paper has aimed to make the case for enlarging the research on the diffusion of norms, best practices and paradigms between the European Union and Asia-Pacific to the field of non-traditional security threats (NTS), thereby outlining a new research agenda on norm diffusion in EU-Asia security relations on the theme of “How Europe Matters in Asian Security. Addressing non-traditional security threats under climate change conditions.” Decision-makers in Asia-Pacific, with the Asian-Pacific Region being the economic powerhouse of the world these days, but also the most haunted by NTS, has been searching for templates and inspirations to address those global challenges. The European Union, on the other hand, has a vivid interest in stability in the region and in keeping its maritime routes open and free from sources of conflict, such as the intensifying territorial disputes or piracy, with 90% of the EU trade being seaborne. Globally, the EU has an interest in cooperating in addressing these challenges on a global level that have been further magnified by climate change, such as scarcity-induced conflicts, mass migration and other consequences of scarcity (e.g. water-energy-food nexus). The paper therefore started with an outline of the EU’s interest in the region, the changing notions in security concepts towards a higher prominence of non-traditional security threats (NTS) in Europe and Asia (and the US) and the potential that the EU can offer to pursue its foreign policy approach.

A majority of academic analyses and policy speeches alike have first and foremost dealt with the EU’s capacity and performance in traditional security areas; however, the EU’s source of influence in Asia-Pacific seems rather to be within its vast amount of expertise and technology concerning those threats that haunt the Asia-Pacific region most: non-traditional security threats such as water, food and energy (in)securities and potential conflicts arising over access to scarce, transboundary resources and impacts of growth policies. Those non-traditional security threats are also listed in the EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and updated in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS (The European Council 2003, 2008). However, the further away a region or target country of EU foreign policy is, the more the EU has to rely on instruments of persuasion and communication, as it has neither the power for legal coercion (as in dealing with Applicant States) nor military coercion, nor the economic incentive of market access as in trade policies.

This is where the theoretical relevance of the research approach comes into play: Drawing on previous research on diffusion mechanisms in EU security policy towards the Asian Pacific region in traditional fields of security policy, approaches from norm diffusion research, particularly the Third Wave focusing on mechanisms and processes, as outlined
in part II of this paper, provide an adequate and capable research framework to analyse the filter factors, scope conditions and mechanisms in the diffusion of norms between Asia and the European Union. The research will thereby contribute to the growing field of diffusion studies as well as to the changing field of the transformative power of the European Union’s foreign policy, but will also bridge the theoretical part with its social relevance by providing parameters and insights to formulate and pursue more effective EU foreign and security policies in addressing global challenges.

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